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IN RE DEEPWATER HORIZON AND THE NEED TO
CLEAN UP RULE 23(B)(3) CERTIFICATION
JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH LEGISLATION
David Inkeles*
The certification stage is considered the main event in class
action litigation. Every class seeking damages must satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) prior to judicial approval. Yet the federal circuits have
been unclear as to how much proof class members must show in
order to satisfy the Rule. A number of circuits have certified
classes for plaintiffs who either cannot show, or cannot possibly
plead, a legal injury. Other circuits have required a more rigorous
Rule 23(b)(3) showing. While the Supreme Court has provided
some guidance on this matter, the split between the circuits is alive
and well. This Note suggests amending existing legislation—the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005—in an attempt to bring some
clarity to the Rule 23(b)(3) landscape. In doing so, plaintiffs,
defendants, the courts, and the class action vehicle, will all benefit.

* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2016; B.A., Skidmore College, 2011. I
would like to thank the Journal staff for their edits, and patience, while working
with me on each draft.
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INTRODUCTION
Both commentators1 and the Supreme Court2 recognize that
“many companies justifiably fear class actions, and with good
reason.”3 Increasingly, most class actions that survive the class
certification stage4 end in settlement.5 This makes the certification
determination the defining moment in a class action’s life.6 A
court’s denial of certification “can be the ‘death knell’ of the

1

See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class
Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the
Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 546 (2006); Kent A. Lambert
Class Action Settlements in Louisiana, 61 LA. L. REV. 89, 131–133 (2000)
(observing the “unprecedented extortive leverage” that class action suits can
have on defendants).
2
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752
(2011) (“[W]hen damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential
claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often
become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of devastating loss,
defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.”); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases.”).
3
Robert W. Wood, Defining Employees and Independent Contractors:
Don’t Try This at Home!, BUS. L. TODAY, May–June 2008, at 45, 48.
4
Class certification is the initial step the plaintiff(s) seeking to bring a class
action must satisfy in order to “aggregate their claims and proceed as a class
against a common defendant.” Ryan Patrick Phair, Resolving the “Choice-OfLaw Problem” in Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
835, 835 (2010).
5
Robert G. Bone & David E. Evans, Class Certification and the
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1291 (2002) (“[T]he vast majority of
certified class actions settle, most soon after certification.”).
6

For class members, a favorable certification decision can mean
greater litigating power and enhanced settlement leverage.
And, for the defendant, certification can mean the difference
between facing a massive and essentially uninsurable liability
risk in one suit or a more manageable series of risks in
individual suits. Because strategic implications are so
substantial, parties today invest a great deal in litigating
certification motions.
Id. at 1262–63.
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case.”7 Conversely, an affirmative grant may “create such a death
threat to [the] defendant that settlement is her only option.”8
The federal circuits are deeply divided, however, as to one
significant issue that figures prominently in class certification
decisions and, by implication, settlement. There is no consensus as
to whether, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,9 courts may certify a class that includes a plurality of
members who have not, individually, pled facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct caused their injuries.
Courts in the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits decline
certification when the putative class contains members who cannot
trace their injuries to the defendant’s actions.10 Yet the Second,
Third, and Fifth Circuits have followed a less rigorous standard,
granting certification even when significant portions of the class
include plaintiffs unable to allege a colorable claim.11
7

Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation:
Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 325
(2011); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared To Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
8
Id.
9
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “a
class action may be maintained if,” along with satisfying Rule 23(a),
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(d) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
10
See Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 780–81 (8th Cir.
2013); Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782, 788
(11th Cir. 2014); In re Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
11
See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242–43 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that “a settlement class’s failure to satisfy the fraud-on-themarket presumption does not necessarily preclude a finding of predominance”);
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 304 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that, under
Rule 23(b)(3) and Third Circuit precedent, certification of a class is proper
without requiring individual class members to state a valid legal claim); In re
Deepwater Horizon, 744 F.3d 370, 380 (5th Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J., concurring)
(claimants were not required to prove their claims using trial-type evidence that
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This Note focuses primarily on two recent Fifth Circuit
decisions. Each decision involved litigation that arose out of the
2010 Deepwater Horizon12 oil spill. The first decision, in January
2014, held that Rule 23(b)(3)13 was met despite noting that
members of the class were not required to submit evidence of
damages.14 In March, the Fifth Circuit held that class members
were not required to prove their claims using trial-type evidence to
trace their alleged damages to the spill.15
Congress must put forth a uniform pleading standard as to the
level of proof of injury that class members must show in order to
meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Congress can
accomplish this by amending existing legislation—the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005.16 Providing clarity in this context will
benefit class members17 and defendants,18 and increase the
showed their injuries were traceable to the spill).
12
Deepwater Horizon, which will be used interchangeably with the “BP
Oil Spill,” refers to the April 2010 explosion of a British Petroleum (BP) mobile
offshore drilling unit in the Gulf of Mexico, which killed eleven workers, and
resulted in “the Nation’s largest oil spill ever, with substantial environmental
and economic impacts.” Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer
Continental Shelf—Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development on the
Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed. Reg. 63346, 63354 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be
codified at 30 CFR Part 250).
13
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
14
In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 815–19
(5th Cir. 2014).
15
In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 380
(5th Cir. 2014).
16
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15, 2071).
17
The Supreme Court has recognized the need for heightened scrutiny at
certification in order to ensure that plaintiffs are not burdened by overbroad
class definitions, acknowledging that, when faced with settlement certification
questions, courts “need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial”
but, at the same time, “other specifications of the Rule [23]—those designed to
protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions—
demand undiluted, even heightened, attention.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see also Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through
the Certification Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 112–13 (2010) (describing the
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viability of the class action vehicle going forward by ensuring that
Rule 23(b)(3)’s aims of equity, uniformity of result, and efficiency
are pursued.19
Part I of this Note provides a primer on class actions and the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). Part II focuses on
the Deepwater Horizon litigation, beginning at the district court
level and tracing two decisions to the Fifth Circuit. Part III
discusses the implications of these decisions and assesses the two
competing approaches the circuits currently follow as to Rule
23(b)(3) certification. This discussion will show how the approach
taken by the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits is inconsistent with
CAFA and the Supreme Court’s precedent.
Part IV discusses the preliminary concerns that the CAFA
amendment must consider. This includes a discussion of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) of 1995.20
The PSLRA, which added a heightened pleading standard to
securities fraud cases, will be useful in thinking about whether and
how to draft the proposed amendment. Part V will conclude by
urging Congress to adopt a modified Individualized Proof
standard, currently utilized by the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits. It will describe the specific components of this standard
and the necessity that it includes exceptions for certain types of
class actions. In setting this standard, Congress would not only
support the central aims of CAFA and Rule 23(b)(3) but would
codify a fair and consistent standard in an area of uncertain
jurisprudence.21
social costs associated with erroneous certifications).
18
See Bone, supra note 17, at 110 (describing how tightening the standard
of proof can work to avoid certification of meritless or weak class actions and
thereby reduce the pressure on defendants to settle).
19
As the advisory committee’s comments to Rule 23(b)(3) make clear, the
viability of class actions depends on achieving “economies of time, effort, and
expense, and [promoting] uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable
results.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966).
20
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
21
Two of Congress’s stated purposes behind CAFA were to “assure fair
and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims,” and to
“benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices.”
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I. CLASS ACTION PRIMER (POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND CAFA)
The following discussion begins with the policy goals that
underlie class actions. It will then describe procedural
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b). Part
I.C provides background on the Class Action Fairness Act, its
drafters’ goals, and its impact on class action litigation. This will
show how the Act’s omission of a pleading standard has led to
inconsistent approaches from the circuits. Part I concludes with the
Supreme Court’s recent attempts to resolve the issues surrounding
Rule 23(b)(3) class action certification.
A.

Representative Litigation: Policy Rationales Underlying
the Class Action

The class action device provides a vehicle for the aggregation
of claims among individual but similarly situated plaintiffs when
case-by-case litigation may be impractical or inefficient.22 In
aggregating a suit that thousands of individuals may be unwilling
or unable to pursue on their own, class actions promote important
policy goals, including the compensation of victims and the
deterrence of bad actors.23 Professor Howard M. Erichson refers to
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note). Rule 23(b)(3) seeks to promote
efficient, fair, and consistent judicial decision-making where numerous small
claims could be aggregated into class actions; but it is likely not appropriate
where the “individual stakes are high and disparities among class members are
great.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (citing Fed. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory
committees notes (1966)).
22
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials of Democratic Mass Litigation, 45
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 499, 503 (2012) (“At its best, mass litigation can be
utilized to promote and protect democratic principles not only when consumer
rights or public health and safety are at issue, but when the case implicates
fundamental human rights.”). See also Megan E. Barriger, Due Process
Limitations on Rule 23(b)(2) Monetary Remedies: Examining the Source of the
Limitation in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 619, 622
(2012) (“Class actions allow plaintiffs to pool claims that would otherwise not
be litigated due to their small size or where joinder of all interested parties
would be impractical.”).
23
See HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL PROCEDURE: WHAT MATTERS
AND WHY 181 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter ERICHSON, CIVIL
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class actions as “representative litigation” because of their
potential to bind individuals who do not participate in the litigation
but are nevertheless sufficiently similar to the class
representative(s).24 It is therefore vital that legitimate plaintiffs,
both named and absent members of the class, are not encumbered
by an overbroad or diluted class definition.25 In order to
accomplish these goals, the law places a series of procedural
requirements that a prospective class must satisfy before
proceeding to litigation.26
B. Certification Procedures
Class certification is governed by Rules 23(a) and (b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27 If potential plaintiffs can
satisfy these Rules, their class will be certified. Individual
members, along with their claims, will then be aggregated for
litigation.28
1. Rule 23(a) and “Mandatory Class Actions” under
Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
The initial step in class certification is meeting the general
requirements of Rule 23(a).29 The prospective class must then
PROCEDURE] (describing the policies furthered by class action litigation).
24
Id.
25
The inability to re-define a class once it has been certified requires
“undiluted, even heightened, attention” to the characteristics of the class at the
Rule 23 stage. See Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?
We’ll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1779 (1997) (quoting Amchem , 521 U.S. at 620).
26
ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 181.
27
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b); ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note
23, at 182–83.
28
ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 182.
29
Under Rule 23(a), every potential class must satisfy each of four general
prerequisites: (1) numerosity, which requires that the number of potential
plaintiffs makes joinder impracticable; (2) commonality, which ensures that
“questions of law or fact common to the class” exist; (3) typicality, in that “the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of claims or defenses
of the class”; and (4) adequacy of representation, which ensures that lead
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demonstrate that it satisfies one of three categories of class actions
under Rule 23(b).30 The first two categories are 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2).31 Although “distinct under the Rules,” these first two
categories “have largely merged with each other.”32 Actions
brought under both (b)(1) and (b)(2) are referred to as “mandatory
class actions.”33 Once certified, members cannot opt out of the
class, and as a result, (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions include a “more
flexible notice provision” for absentees.34 In contrast, Rule
23(b)(3) classes provide absentees the right to opt out and are
characterized by a “more stringent notice requirement.”35
2. Rule 23(b)(3): Damages
Predominance Requirement

Class

Actions

and

The Supreme Court has referred to Rule 23(b)(3) as an
“adventuresome innovation.”36 It is designed for cases where class
treatment is not “as clearly called for” as it is under (b)(1) or

plaintiffs represent absent class members in a fair and adequate manner. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4); ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at
182–83.
30
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at
183.
31
Rule 23(b)(1) permits certification when prosecuting separate actions by
individual members would create “incompatible standards of conduct,” or when
pursuing separate actions would “substantially impair or impede” the class
members’ ability to protect their interests. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A),
23(b)(1)(B). The second category, Rule 23(b)(2), pertains to class actions
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief as opposed to money damages. Under
this category, certification will be granted when the class can show that the
defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
32
Jenna G. Farleigh, Note, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class
Certification, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1594 (2011) (citing RICHARD A.
NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION
195 (2009)).
33
ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 184.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (citing
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)).
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(b)(2).37 Rule 23(b)(1) is used where individual adjudications are
nearly impossible.38 Such may be the case when one party is
“obliged by law to treat the members of the class alike.”39 Rule
23(b)(2) applies to classes seeking injunctive relief, which will
unavoidably affect the entire class in a similar manner.40 Rule
23(b)(3), however, enables the class to seek individualized
monetary relief, which will then be binding upon any member who
does not opt out.41 It is common that a successful Rule 23(b)(3)
class will win a single judgment, or, more likely, reach a settlement
figure from the defendant, that is then apportioned to claimants on
an individual basis, often by a claims administrator.42
Greater procedural requirements have been established in order
for a class to meet certification as a “damages” class under Rule
23(b)(3).43 Principally, these are superiority and predominance.44
The superiority requirement asks the court to consider whether “a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
37

Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615).
See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)–(B).
39
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614. Examples include “a utility acting toward
customers[,] a government imposing a tax[], or where the party must treat all
alike as a matter of practical necessity.” Id. (quoting Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 388 (1967)).
40
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). “‘Civil rights cases against parties charged
with unlawful, class-based discrimination, are prime examples’ of what (b)(2) is
meant to capture.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at
614).
41
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 592 (describing
that Rule 23(b)(3) permits “judgments for money that would bind all class
members save those who opt out”).
42
See Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 466 n.56 (2011) (“[N]either defendants nor courts are
generally involved with the individualized allocation of a total settlement
amount or damages award among plaintiffs.”) (citing 7AA CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1784 (3d ed. 2005)).
43
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
44
ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 185; FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3). There are also the aforementioned structural provisions that provide
absentees with mandatory notice and the right to opt out of any damages class
action certified under the Rule. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Wal-Mart, 131 S.
Ct. at 2545.
38
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efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”45 The predominance
inquiry asks whether “questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.”46 Generally, common questions pertain to the
“defendant’s conduct and class-wide defenses.”47 Individual
questions concern particular issues of causation and damages, as
well as individual defenses by members of the class.48
In many large class actions, there is an asymmetry between the
common questions—the defendant’s liability—and the many
individual questions about damages or causation pertaining to each
member.49 This tension creates practical difficulties for courts as
well as putative class plaintiffs.50 Courts must decide whether, and
in how much detail, to scrutinize the merits of individual claims at
the certification stage.51 Similarly, the class seeking certification
must convince the court upon “some creditable basis” that “factual
differences among the class members’ cases are minor and
immaterial.”52 In practice, the degree of evidence that courts find
sufficient to create this creditable basis varies among circuits.53
This has contributed to an uneven field of Rule 23(b)(3)
jurisprudence.54 This Note argues that clarity can be provided
through amendment to the Class Action Fairness Act.
45

ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 185 (quoting Walmart,
131 S. Ct. at 2545).
46
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
47
ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 185.
48
Id.
49
See Alex Parkinson, Comcast Corp v. Behrend and Chaos on the
Ground, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2014) (describing that, in a mass tort
class action, establishing the defendant’s negligence “will be nearly, if not
exactly, identical” to evidence offered by any other claimant, while the question
of damages will likely be unique to each member).
50
Id. at 1217.
51
See 6A STACY L. DAVIS, ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS
EDITION §12:210 (2012).
52
Id.
53
See Farleigh, supra note 32, at 1588 (describing the variance among
circuits in applying Rule 23 certification procedures).
54
See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1613 (2008) [hereinafter Erichson, CAFA’s Impact]
(describing the “disproportionate growth” in filings in circuits with more liberal
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C. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
1. Federalizing Class Actions: CAFA’s Aims and
Purposes
The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) was enacted in
2005.55 Predicated on strong tort reform56 overtones, CAFA was
justified, in large part, upon the belief that the class action vehicle
was being abused.57 For example, supporters of the legislation
feared that plaintiffs could gain an unfair advantage over corporate
defendants by cherry-picking particular state courts around the
country where judges and juries were known to be unsympathetic
to large commercial actors.58 In response, proponents of the bill
believed that “federal courts could offer a safe haven”59 from what
the American Tort Reform Association artfully dubbed “judicial
hellholes.”60 In order to channel class claims from state courts into
certification standards).
55
Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind
the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 97 (2009).
56
Tort reform, in its classical sense, seeks to minimize legal rules that are
especially costly for defendants. See ‘Common Sense’ Legislation: The Birth of
Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1996) (“Classical tort
reformers call for the elimination of legal rules that are particularly expensive
for defendants.”). When Republicans took over the House of Representatives in
1994, one of the key components of the “Contract with America,” a ten-point
series of legislative proposals, was passing tort reform legislation. Patrick
Hoopes, Tort Reform in the Wake of United States v. Lopez, 24 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 785, 785 (1997).
57
After a bipartisan Senate majority passed the bill, President G.W. Bush
called CAFA a “strong step forward in our efforts to reform the litigation
system,” noting that the legal system encouraged “junk lawsuits that
undermine[d] confidence in our courts while hurting our economy, costing jobs,
and threatening small businesses.” Statement on Senate Action on Class-Action
Lawsuit Reform Legislation, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 227 (Feb. 10,
2005)).
58
See Cameron Fredman, Plaintiffs’ Paradise Lost: Diversity of
Citizenship and Amount in Controversy Under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2006) (describing the concerns of
CAFA’s proponents).
59
Id. at 1027–28.
60
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Taking a Stand Against Lawlessness in
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federal courts, CAFA makes three significant changes to class
action procedure: it gives federal courts original jurisdiction over
class actions,61 expands federal diversity jurisdiction pertaining to
class actions, and updates procedures for settling class actions in
federal court.62
Section 2 of CAFA articulates the law’s findings and purposes.
It is clear that the bill’s supporters were concerned with the
economic costs associated with class actions.63 Legislators noted
abuses of the class action vehicle over the prior decade that
“harmed class members with legitimate claims and defendants that
have acted responsibly,” and resulted in many class members
receiving little or no benefit in cases where “unjustified awards are
made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members.”64
Congress found that these “[a]buses . . . undermine the national
judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce.”65
Accordingly, Section 2(b) declares that the purposes of CAFA are
to: “assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with
legitimate claims,” and “benefit society by encouraging innovation
and lowering consumer prices.”66
American Courts: How Trial Court Judges and Appellate Justices Can Protect
their Courts from Becoming Judicial Hellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215,
216 (2004).
61
Pursuant to CAFA, federal courts have original jurisdiction over class
actions if minimal diversity is met, the class contains at least one hundred
members, and the aggregate amount in controversy is at least $5,000,000.
Patricia A. Seith, Civil Rights, Labor, and the Politics of Class Action
Jurisdiction, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 91 (2011).
62
Key settlement provisions include enhanced judicial scrutiny over
“coupon settlements,” which allows the court to hold a hearing and issue written
determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class
members, as well as a notification provision, requiring the defendant to send
notice to the appropriate state and federal official in each state where a class
member resides. See Linda Pissott Reig et al., The Class Action Fairness Act of
2005: Overview, Historical Perspective, and Settlement Requirements, 40 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1087, 1097–98 (2005) (summarizing CAFA and
describing the three primary changes).
63
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat.
4, 4–5 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711).
64
Id. at 4.
65
Id. at 5.
66
Id.
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2. CAFA’s Impact on Forum Shopping: Same Shopping,
Different Shops
In the years since its enactment, CAFA has faced a variety of
criticisms.67 Some have argued that the law has unnecessarily
increased burdens on bringing and certifying class actions.68
Others have assailed CAFA as being predicated on anecdotal,
overly cynical views toward class action plaintiffs and attorneys.69
One thing is clear. Although CAFA has succeeded in funneling
class actions to federal courts, it has not ameliorated the perceived
abuses of the class action vehicle by way of forum shopping.70
Shortly after CAFA’s enactment, Federal District Judge Sarah
Vance portended that, “although Congress intended CAFA to
eliminate ‘forum shopping’ in the class action arena, it is safe to
predict that the parties will continue to engage in strategic behavior

67

See Archis A. Parasharami & Kevin S. Ranlett, The Class Action
Fairness Act, Five Years Later, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/The-Class-Action-Fairness-Act-five-yearslater-04-12-2010 (describing that, in the five years following its passage,
CAFA’s intended reforms had “mixed success”).
68
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a
Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2528 (2008) (arguing that CAFA’s
minimal diversity requirements for removal, namely the application of multiple
states’ laws to highly individualized issues across a class, results in
manageability problems that prevent many class actions from being certified in
federal court); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 729, 745 (2013) (“Federal courts have not simply heard and decided more
cases as a result of Rule 23(f) and CAFA; they have adopted troublesome new
standards applicable to plaintiffs seeking classwide relief.”).
69
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (2008)
(discussing that CAFA has been called “legislation by anecdote”); see also
Erichson, CAFA’s Impact, supra note 54, at 1596 (arguing that proponents of
CAFA were motivated by a “mistrust of class action lawyers” and “successfully
portrayed class action lawyers as opportunistic aggregators who get rich on
litigation of their own making”).
70
Parasharami & Ranlett, supra note 67 (“That CAFA has shifted many
cases from state to federal court does not mean that forum-shopping has ceased .
. . plaintiffs’ attorneys have adapted by choosing to file suit in particular federal
courts . . . where the law is particularly favorable to class certification.”).
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when it comes to choosing a forum.”71 Preserving elements of
strategic behavior is important for maintaining the adversarial
nature of litigation. But when the circuits vary in evaluating critical
questions of proof at the class certification stage, all participants in
the litigation face a troublesome degree of uncertainty. This
demands legislative clarity in order to serve the policy goals that
CAFA and the class action vehicle are designed to serve.
3.

“A Maze of Ambiguity”:72 The Problem of No Clear
Standard in a Post-CAFA World

CAFA’s express legislative intent demonstrates two prominent
aims. First, the law provides a guarantee that legitimately harmed
class members can receive fair and prompt adjudication through
the class action vehicle.73 Second, the law provides an assurance
that defendants responsible for compensating these harms do not
suffer unnecessary losses by overcompensating or paying for
meritless claims.74 Yet, omitted from the Act are means through
which courts can ensure that these aims are achieved. Nowhere in
the law is there a procedural standard that ensures a causal
relationship between each plaintiff’s alleged injury and the
defendant’s conduct.75
71

Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1642 (2006). Judge Vance appears to be correct. In 2007, the
Federal Judicial Center released a preliminary study assessing CAFA’s impact
on channeling state-law classes into federal courts. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact,
supra note 54, at 1607–08. This data not only showed an increase in the number
of class actions both filed and removed to federal courts, but that plaintiffs’
attorneys filed originally in the most favorable federal forums. Id. at 1613
(“Given lawyers’ perception of the Ninth Circuit as relatively liberal on class
certification, the disproportionate growth of filings in its districts should come as
no surprise . . . . The growth was much smaller in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.”).
72
Farleigh, supra note 32, at 1588.
73
Congress explicitly sought to “assure fair and prompt recoveries for class
members with legitimate claims.” Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711).
74
Congress’s stated purpose was to “benefit society by encouraging
innovation and lowering consumer prices.” Id.
75
See Kevin Tamm, The Class Action Fairness Act and Colorable Reasons
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As a result of Congress’s failure to articulate a standard,
“[l]itigants seeking class certification still muddle through a maze
of ambiguity.”76 The principles of proof followed by a particular
circuit will determine the issue of certification as well as the size of
the class with which a defendant will likely seek to negotiate in
settlement proceedings. When these principles vary significantly,
many of the concerns that precipitated CAFA’s enactment still
remain intact.
Yet drafters of the Act may have been wary of including a “one
size fits all” standard of proof due to concerns of impracticability.
Class action litigation arises in a wide range of contexts, with
issues of proof varying greatly depending upon the type of harm
alleged and the size of the proposed class. For example, while
securities fraud cases may typically advance past the certification
stage, Title VII claims face a steeper burden in meeting Rule 23’s
commonality and predominance requirements.77
In a securities fraud action involving a security traded on a
public exchange, courts have held the overarching finding of
reliance sufficient to fulfill Rule 23(b)(3).78 In such cases, classes
for Separate Class Actions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 313, 329 (2012). The act does not
address the proper standard of proof or pleading required to bring a class action.
Id. A statute predicated on removing class actions to federal court, CAFA was
notably ambiguous on the question of which party has the burden of proof to
establish damages exceeding the amount in controversy necessary for diversity
jurisdiction. Id.
76
Farleigh, supra note 32, at 1588.
77
See Klonoff, supra note 68, at 824 (“[S]ecurities fraud suits involving
securities traded on a major stock exchange are commonly certified. Such cases
tend to involve overarching issues that impact all class members, and seek
damages that can be easily calculated.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011) (denying certification in an employment discrimination
class action, and holding that in certification of Title VII claims, “[w]ithout
some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those [employment]
decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’
claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question”).
78
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184–85
(2011); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988); In re Bank of Am.
Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citing authority that in these “fraud on the market” cases, once “‘liability can be
determined on a class-wide basis, individualized damage issues are not
ordinarily a bar to class certification’”) (citation omitted).
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will be certified if plaintiffs can satisfy the rebuttable presumption
that they relied upon the defendant’s deceptive acts in making the
relevant transaction.79 If this is done, class plaintiffs need not prove
“loss causation”—that the defendant’s conduct or misconduct in
fact caused the economic loss complained of.80 In contrast, some
courts impose a steeper certification burden in cases alleging
disparate treatment employment discrimination under Title VII.81
In Title VII cases, the alleged harm is that a class of employees
was discriminated against on the basis of their membership in a
protected class.82 But successful certification demands the plaintiff
to show that the employer subjected members of the class to a
“pattern or practice of intentional discriminatory treatment.”83
Naturally, these showings become difficult to make when “overt
acts of employment discrimination are relatively rare,” and
practices take on “more subtle if no less invidious forms.”84
Recognizing these differences, some commentators have eschewed
arguments advancing a uniform standard and instead have urged
that a more flexible approach is optimal.85
A more flexible approach would permit judges to exercise
discretion in determining whether Rule 23’s requirements are met,
depending on the unique characteristics or category of the claim.86
79

Erica P. John Fund, 131 S. Ct. at 2182; Basic, 485 U.S. at 250. Each
plaintiff doesn’t individually have to prove that they actually relied on the
deceptive acts. Erica P. John Fund, 131 S. Ct. at 2185. Instead, as long as the
misrepresentation is reflected in the market price, there is a presumption of
reliance. Id.
80
Erica P. John Fund, 131 S. Ct. 2179. This is in part because, once
reliance is shown, issues of individual damages are readily susceptible to
calculation. Klonoff, supra note 68, at 824–25 (“Such cases tend to involve
overarching issues that impact all class members, and seek damages that can be
easily calculated.”).
81
Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 619, 620 (1986).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 628.
84
Id.
85
See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1897 (2014) (arguing that district courts should exercise
pragmatic discretion in deciding to certify a class).
86
See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class
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Yet this suggestion would likely contribute to the divergent
approaches among the circuits and the problems associated with
forum shopping.87 This is certainly the case in multi-district,
national, or interstate litigation, where the availability of a “single
positive trumps all the negatives.”88 A decision to certify a
nationwide 23(b)(3) class binds the representative plaintiffs and
absentees that are similarly situated.89 But a denial of certification
will not produce the same permanent effect since the plaintiffs may
subsequently seek certification in state court or other circuit
courts.90 Thus, although a majority of courts might find
certification inappropriate, plaintiffs can still file in other courts,
strategically choosing those with more amenable Rule 23(b)(3)
certification standards. All that is needed then is one “positive”
result and a nationwide class is certified.91
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, LA. L. REV. 157,
165 (2004) (“Without including flexibility that permits judges to use judicial
discretion in managing a mass tort according to its unique characteristics,
reforms that purport to overhaul the system of mass torts have not succeeded.”).
87
As the following section discusses, under a flexible approach, Courts
have proven incapable of applying standards that are remotely consistent,
allowing class counsel to select the most favorable forum to file their claims. See
also Erichson, CAFA’s Impact, supra note 54, at 1613 (describing how lawyers’
perceptions of a given circuit’s certification procedures effect filing).
88
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
766–67 (7th Cir. 2003).
89
See ERICHSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 183 (describing the
binding impact of an affirmative certification grant.). In a damages class, these
members may opt-out, whereas members of a class certified under (b)(1) or
(b)(2) cannot. Id. at 182–84; see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368,
2380 (2011) (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may
bind nonparties. What does have this effect is a class action approval.”)
(emphasis added).
90
In Smith v. Bayer Corp., the Supreme Court unanimously held that
federal court denial of certification is an improper basis to preclude absent
members of the uncertified class from seeking certification of the same class in
state court. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2373; see also JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 1
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:16 (11th ed. 2014).
91
In a pre-CAFA decision, Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook used an
illustrative example to highlight this notion. Although Easterbrook was
addressing this problem in state courts, his observation rings true with regard to
federal circuits in a post-CAFA world. First, he posited to “[s]uppose that every
state in the nation . . . deem[s] inappropriate a nationwide class” related to a
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D. Wal-Mart, Comcast, and the Supreme Court’s Attempts to
Resolve the Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance Analysis

Still, commentators in favor of a uniform standard believe that
the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, is the appropriate body
to clarify these issues.92 If the present circuit split and the Fifth
Circuit’s BP decisions are any indication, however, judicial
discretion does not appear to be the solution. Before addressing
these cases, it is important to set the stage with two recent Supreme
Court decisions regarding Rule 23(b)(3) analysis. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes93 and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend94 provide this
necessary backdrop.
In Wal-Mart, current and former female employees brought a
class action against the retail giant on behalf of nearly 1.5 million
plaintiffs.95 The class alleged that Wal-Mart’s hiring and
promotion practices discriminated against women in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 As with the BP
litigation, the critical question was whether individual issues
pertaining to the putative class were so central as to preclude
certification.97 The Court found that the members failed to prove
that common questions of law or fact—namely, the pattern or
practices of discrimination—predominated over any questions
affecting individual members.98 The Supreme Court held “Rule 23
does not set forth a mere pleading standard . . . certification must
particular set of claims or products. Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 766. In
practice, this would yield “something like ‘9 of 10 judges in every state’” or in
federal courts, “3 of 4 judges,” to rule against certifying the potential class. Id.
He went on to explain that “[a]lthough the 10% that see things otherwise are a
distinct minority, one is bound to turn up if plaintiffs file enough suits—and, if
one nationwide class is certified, then all the no-certification decisions fade into
insignificance.” Id.
92
E.g.,Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 149, 157 (2010) [hereinafter Nagareda, Common
Answers].
93
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
94
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
95
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 2556–57.
98
Id.
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affirmatively demonstrate [the party’s] compliance with the
Rule—that is, [the party] must be prepared to prove that there are
in fact . . .common questions of law or fact.”99
In Comcast, a group of cable television subscribers sought
certification under 23(b)(3) of an antitrust class action against
Comcast Corporation.100 The class alleged that Comcast had
entered into unlawful “swap” agreements101 with regional
competitors in violation of federal antitrust laws.102 The issue
before the Supreme Court was whether the common question of
liability sufficiently predominated over any individual damages
issues across the class.103 Specifically, the Court considered
whether a district court could certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3)
“without resolving whether the plaintiff class ha[s] introduced
admissible evidence . . . to show that the case is susceptible to
awarding damages on a class-wide basis.”104 Denying certification,
the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must demonstrate a reliable,
non-speculative, model for quantifying damages on a class-wide
basis to meet Rule 23(b)(3).105 The Court reiterated that inquiry
into these models may often require rigorous analysis of the
underlying merits.106
II. THE IN RE DEEPWATER HORIZON DECISIONS & THEIR
IMPLICATIONS
As the following discussion will demonstrate, courts have been
inconsistent in their application of the Supreme Court’s recent
Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit’s In re Deepwater

99

Id. at 2551.
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430 (2013).
101
Id. at 1430. This practice would consist of Comcast “exchanging its
television operations in different regions with those of competitors” in another
consolidated region. Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1220.
102
Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1430.
103
Id. at 1431 n.4.
104
Id.
105
See id. at 1433.
106
Id. at 1432; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(2011).
100
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Horizon decisions highlight the problems in relying on and
applying judicial precedent in this area.
A.

Background: The Spill and In Re Deepwater Horizon
District Court Decisions

On April 20, 2010 an oilrig belonging to British Petroleum
(BP) exploded in the Gulf of Mexico.107 This explosion resulted in
eleven deaths108 and spewed millions of barrels of oil into the
Gulf.109 As a result of this event, thousands of individuals and
businesses filed claims against BP.110 These claims ranged from
cleanup workers’ personal injury claims to hotels’ lost business
allegations.111 In August 2010, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation112 consolidated all federal claims pertaining to the spill
107

Campbell Robertson & Leslie Kaufman, Size of Spill in Gulf of Mexico
Is
Larger
Than
Thought,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
28,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/us/29spill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
108
Id.
109
Richard Thompson, Determining How Much Oil Spilled from BP’s Gulf
Well ‘Not an Easy Task,’ Judge Says, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 27, 2013,
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oilspill/index.ssf/2013/06/determining_how_
much_oil_spill.html (noting the difficulty in pinpointing an exact figure, but
describing that estimates have ranged from 3.26–5.5 million barrels of oil spilled
as a result of the accident).
110
Kathy Finn, BP Oil Spill Claims Chief Braces for Surge in Filings,
INSURANCE J., May 17, 2013, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2013/05/17/292400.htm (citing BP Claims Administrator noting that, as of May
15, 2013, 165,877 claims were filed, of which 40,970 were eligible for
payment).
111
Douglas McCollam, The Other Oil Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/magazine/07oilt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing the various groups of claimants who
had filed claims against BP).
112
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, consisting of seven sitting
federal judges, determines whether multidistrict litigation should be
consolidated to a particular district court. Overview of Panel, UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/
panel-info/overview-panel. These procedures are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1407,
which allows civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact that
are pending in multiple districts to be centralized to any “district for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” Id. The Panel also selects the judge or
judges to administer the proceedings. Id.
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(excluding securities suits) into one action.113 This included
seventy-seven actions that were initially filed in seven federal
courts.114 Most of these claims, the Panel recognized, were
“comprised largely of putative class actions seeking recovery for
property damage and other economic losses.”115 After recognizing
that the Eastern District of Louisiana represented the closest
jurisdiction to “the geographic and psychological ‘center of
gravity,’”116 all claims were transferred to District Judge Carl
Barbier of that court.117
On October 19, 2010, the district court issued a Pretrial Order
that created “pleading bundles” for each type of claim.118 The most
important subclass for this Note is the “B1 bundle,” or the
Business and Economic Loss (“BEL”) claimants.119 This group
consists of all private, non-governmental claims for economic loss

113

In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mex., on Apr.
20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012).
114
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex.,
on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2010). Thirty-one
actions were filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana, twenty-three in the
Southern District of Alabama, ten in the Northern District of Florida, eight in the
Southern District of Mississippi, two in the Western District of Louisiana, two in
the Southern District of Texas, and one in the Northern District of Alabama. Id.
115
Id. at 1354.
116
Id. at 1355.
117
In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
118
Id. Some bundles were created based upon the type of plaintiff
involved—for example, private individuals versus emergency responders—
while others were designated based upon the nature of the injury. Edward F.
Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict
Litigation Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237, 240 (2011); Cent. for Biological
Diversity, Inc. v. BP America Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 432 (2013). Rule
16(c)(2)(L) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables a court to create
these bundles as a judicial management tool. See 5 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts.
§ 60:5 (3d ed. 2014) (describing that the Fifth Circuit relied on the Rule in
upholding the use of pleading bundles in the BP litigation).
119
Pretrial Order No. 11 [Case Management Order No. 1] at 3, In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (MDL No. 2179) [hereinafter Pretrial
Order No. 11], available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/
Orders/PTO11.pdf.
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and property damages.120 On August 13, 2012 the BEL claimants
moved to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3).121
1. The District Court’s Rule 23 Certification Decision
On December 21, 2012, the district court certified the BEL
claimants pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3).122 The class was
defined as: individuals123 and entities124 that were (1) within one of
several geographic areas within two years of the spill125 and, (2)
whose claims met at least one of fifteen Damage Categories.126 In
120

In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 900–01; Pretrial Order No.
11, supra note 119, at 3.
121
In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 902–03.
122
Id. at 913.
123
The court defined “individuals” to include “all Natural Persons” who,
“at any time between April 20, 2010 and April 16, 2012, lived in, worked in,
were offered and accepted work in, owned or leased real or personal property
located within, or owned or leased or worked on a vessel harbored or home
ported” in one of the geographical areas. Id. at 965–66.
124
The court defined this term to include “all entities doing business or
operating” in the geographic areas that “at any time from April 20, 2010 to April
16, 2012, owned, operated, or leased a physical facility” in the area and sold
products in the area directly to consumers, end users, or other entities, or entities
that “regularly purchased seafood harvested from specified gulf waters in order
to produce goods for resale.” Id. at 966. “Entities” were also defined as any
service business with “one or more full-time employees (including owneroperators) who performed their full-time services” while present in the areas
between the relevant time period, as well as any entities doing business that
“owned, operated, or leased a vessel” home ported in the area, or landed seafood
in the area, or which “owned or leased real property in the area” between April
20, 2010 to April 16, 2012. Id.
125
The areas cover the entire states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama, as well as thirty counties in Florida, four counties in Texas, and “all
adjacent Gulf waters, bays, estuaries, straits, and other tidal or brackish waters”
within Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and described counties of Texas and
Florida. Id. U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico were also specified and described
in a map, and included within the geographic definition as “Specified Gulf
Waters.” Id.
126
Damage Category 1.3.1.2. pertains to economic damages. Id. at 967. It
includes “[l]oss of income, earnings or profits suffered by Natural Persons or
Entities as a result” of the spill. Id. Additional categories include commercial
fishermen, vessels that were physically damaged, and real property (and

THE NEED TO CLEAN UP RULE 23(B)(3)

763

its certification order, the district court purportedly settled two
issues regarding causation and individual damages.127
On the causation issue, the district court wrote that only “some
business claimants must demonstrate that the spill caused their
losses.”128 The court further held that “[i]n many other cases
causation is presumed.”129 Causation was presumed for claimants
residing or working in the areas defined “Zone A.”130 Other
claimants, including businesses located in Zones B and C, were
required to prove causation.131 This could be shown with
documents “typically required to calculate business economic
loss,” or “documents that businesses either keep in the ordinary
course or that may readily be prepared from a business’s books and
records.”132
property sales) damage. Id. at 966–67. A full list of every damage category, and
exceptions, is described in the district court’s opinion, under Section 1.3.1 of the
class definition. Id.
127
The court discusses these issues in its Rule 23(b)(3) analysis. See id. at
924–28.
128
Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
129
Id. The district court relied on the parties’ Settlement Agreement to
provide guidance as to which claimants would need to demonstrate causation
and which would not. Id. at 906. BP and the BEL claimants began settlement
negotiations in earnest in February 2011. Id. at 901. By August 13, 2012, the
parties moved for final judicial approval of the agreement. Id. at 902.
130
This includes specific geographic areas that are set out in detailed maps
in Exhibits 1A–1C of the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement at Ex.
1A–C, In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., on Apr.
20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (No. 12-970) [hereinafter District
Court Settlement Agreement], available at http://www.deepwaterhorizon
economicsettlement.com/docs/Amended_Settlement_Agreement_5.2.12_optimi
zed.pdf#search. It includes coastal areas in Southeast and Southwest Louisiana,
and New Orleans, an area in Southeastern Texas, areas along southern
Mississippi and Alabama, as well as areas in the Florida Panhandle, coastal
areas from Tampa to Marco Island (along the Western coast of Florida), and the
Florida Keys. Id. Exhibit 4B describes a list of claimants for “which there is no
causation requirement.” Id. at Exh. 4B. This includes businesses located in Zone
A, as well as businesses located in other geographical Zones that meet certain
specified business definitional criteria. Id.
131
Id.
132
The Court, however, never specified what these documents might
consist of. In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
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The court then addressed proof of individual damages.133 The
court held that “issues of individual injury do not defeat
predominance [Rule 23(b)(3)]” for the purposes of certifying the
class for settlement.134 It acknowledged that, were the class action
to proceed to litigation rather than settlement, “certain causation
issues remain that would have to be decided on an individual
basis.”135 Moreover, the court noted, it was sufficient that “core
causation issues” could “be decided on a class-wide basis.”136
These issues pertained primarily to BP’s liability.137 As for the
claimants, the court found it would be “fairly capable” to attribute
damages through the “various common methodologies” and
“formulaic calculations” outlined in the Settlement Agreement.138
2. Settlement Agreement Decision and Order by the
District Court
In October 2013, a panel of three Fifth Circuit judges
addressed an earlier district court decision interpreting the parties’
Settlement Agreement.139 In a portion of that Fifth Circuit opinion,
133

Id. at 924–25 (finding that “issues of individual injury do not defeat
predominance for purposes of evaluating this settlement class’s certification”).
134
Id. at 924.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 924–25 (quoting Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d
598, 602 (5th Cir. 2006)) (“[L]imited individualized issues do not defeat
predominance in light of the core common issues . . . the necessity of calculating
damages on an individual basis will not necessarily preclude certification.”).
137
The court wrote that “[a]ll of the key factual issues are common among
members of the class.” Id. at 922. These issues included whether BP had a valid
superseding cause defense, and whether BP unreasonably failed to take
precautions to ensure that, in the event of a blowout, the oil would be contained
in the immediate vicinity of the well. Id.
138
Id. at 926.
139
In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon I), 732 F.3d 326, 346 (5th
Cir. 2013). According to BP, the Claims Administrator had erroneously
interpreted Exhibit 4C of the Settlement Agreement by “not require[ing] the
matching of revenues and expenses” in processing BEL claims. In re Deepwater
Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2014).
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Judge Clement expressed concern that, under the district court’s
interpretation,140 damages may be awarded to “BEL claimants who
admittedly either have suffered no loss at all or have suffered
losses that were not caused by the oil spill.”141 She found that the
district court lacked the authority to “approve the settlement of a
class that included members that had not sustained losses at all, or
had sustained losses unrelated to the oil spill.”142 Judge Southwick,
in a concurring opinion, acknowledged that, while “logical,” the
issues raised by Judge Clement could not be resolved because they
had not been briefed or argued by the parties.143 By a 2-1 vote, the
Fifth Circuit remanded for the district court to address whether
certification was appropriate under the challenged interpretation.144
On remand, the district court upheld certification under Rule 23
although the accepted interpretation of the Agreement eschewed
the need for groups of claimants to submit evidence that
demonstrated causation.145

140

In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 822–23
(5th Cir. 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting). Section 1.3.1.2 of the settlement
agreement pertains to BEL claimants, and incorporates Exhibit 4B, which
establishes causation requirements, by reference. Id. at 823. Together, the
language of these provisions establishes a subset of claimants within the class
where causation is presumed. Id. The Claims Administrator’s interpretation,
which the district court agreed with, stated that he would compensate eligible
BEL claimants “without regard to whether such losses resulted or may have
resulted from a cause other than the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.” Id.
141
Deepwater Horizon I, 732 F.3d at 340.
142
Id. “A class settlement is not a private agreement between the parties. It
is a creature of Rule 23, which authorizes its use to resolve the legal claims of a
class ‘only with the court’s approval.” (citation omitted). Id. at 343.
143
Id. at 346.
144
Id.
145
Order and Reasons [Responding to Remand of Business Economic Loss
Issues], In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., on
Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) available at
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/12242013Order(RevisedBELrema
nd).pdf.
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B.

The Fifth Circuit’s Decisions Affirming Certification &
Causation

The opinions described above resulted in two separate
decisions by the Fifth Circuit on appeal. Taken together, these
opinions highlight the less stringent of the two prevailing
approaches applied by the federal circuits regarding the proof class
members must provide in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).
1. The January 2014 Decision Affirming Certification
(“Certification Decision”)
In January 2014, the Fifth Circuit rejected BP’s challenge to
the district court’s certification decision.146 The court first
addressed Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.147 BP argued
that the class failed to meet this requirement because of the range
of “class members’ economic injuries” and “the inclusion of
members who ‘have suffered no injury at all’” in the certified
class.148 The court disagreed. It held that certification did not
violate Rule 23(a)(2) because a number of factual and legal issues
were “central to the validity of all” class members’ claims.149
According to the court, questions as to “[w]hether BP had a valid
superseding cause defense,” or “[w]hether BP took appropriate and
timely steps to stop the release of hydrocarbons from the well,”
were central to all class members’ claims.150
The court then addressed whether the district court erred in
146

In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 795
(5th Cir. 2014). BP additionally challenged whether the claimants had standing
under Article III, which the court rejected. Id.
147
Id. at 809–810. As described above in Part I.B.1, Rule 23(a)(2) requires
a showing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
148
Deepwater Horizon II, 739 F.3d at 810 (citation omitted).
149
Id. at 811. The Fifth Circuit found that in order to satisfy commonality
under (a)(2), “class members must raise at least one contention that is central to
the validity of each class member’s claims.” Id. at 810. Yet a central contention
need not relate to damages. Rather, “an instance of injurious conduct, which
would usually relate more directly to the defendant’s liability than to the
claimant’s damages, could satisfy commonality. Id.
150
Id. at 811.
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finding that the class met Rule 23(b)(3). BP argued that
predominance could not be satisfied when class members’ damage
calculations gave “rise primarily to individual questions that are
not capable of class-wide resolution.”151 The Fifth Circuit
disagreed. Instead, it held that the diverse individualized damage
calculations did not render Rule 23(b)(3) fatal.152 Rather, as it did
earlier in its Rule 23(a)(2) analysis, the court emphasized the list of
common issues identified by the district court that predominated
over those affecting only individual members.153 “Nearly all of
these issues” involved factual questions regarding BP’s connection
to the “well design, explosion, discharge of oil, and cleanup
efforts.”154 According to the court, individual questions pertaining
to class members’ damages would not need to be addressed for
purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).155 Had the case proceeded rather than
settled, however, the district court would “have been obliged to
determine” how BP’s liability would translate into compensation
on an individual basis.156 But with the parties’ reaching an
agreement, the court concluded, “by definition the litigation has
been resolved and the questions have been answered.”157
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit rejected BP’s argument that the class
lacked predominance and affirmed certification of the class for
settlement.158
2.

The March 2014 Settlement Agreement Causation
Decision (“Causation Decision”)

In December 2013, BP filed a separate appeal contesting the
district court’s order upholding certification under the challenged
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.159 Under this
151

Id. at 815.
Id.
153
Id. (recalling the list of factual issues addressed below related to BP’s
involvement in the spill).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 818.
156
Id. at 816.
157
Id. at 818.
158
Id. at 818–19.
159
In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 374
152
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interpretation, many claimants were not required to demonstrate
evidence of causation tracing their damages to the spill.160 BP
argued that this prevented the class from satisfying Rule 23(b)(3),
as it produced individual damages questions that would
predominate over any issues common to the class.161 BP alleged
that millions had been paid to dubious claimants with either
inflated claims or damages not traceable to the spill.162 One
anomalous example includes $21 million paid to a Louisiana rice
mill, situated forty miles from the coast, which earned more
revenue the year of the spill than it did in each of the three years
prior.163 BP also pointed to “a large cottage industry” of attorneys
soliciting claimants who had “never believed they had suffered any
losses to file claims ‘[i]f the numbers work.’”164
The Fifth Circuit nevertheless affirmed the district court
order.165 It held that BEL claimants were not required to prove
their claims with trial-type evidence demonstrating that their
injuries or economic losses were traceable to the oil spill.166 Judge
Southwick’s opinion rested in part upon the fact that BP had not
objected to the terms of the Settlement Agreement when it was
pending approval before the district court.167 It also emphasized
that the parties had agreed to the very form upon which BEL
claimants would input their claims.168 According to the court, any
(5th Cir. 2014).
160
See id. (summarizing the district court’s interpretation as “eschewing the
need for evidence of causation”).
161
Brief for Appellees BP Exploration & Prod. Inc., et al. at 43, In re
Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2014) (No.
12-970) 2013 WL 8718641.
162
Id. at 20.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 21. Members of the certified class included a wireless phone
retailer that received over $135,000, despite losing its property to a fire prior to
the spill, and a lawyer awarded over $172,000 although he lost his license to
practice in 2009. Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Sympathy for the Devil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/opinion/joe-nocera-sympathy-forthe-devil.html.
165
Deepwater Horizon III, 744 F.3d at 378.
166
Id. at 376–77.
167
Id. at 378.
168
Id. at 376.
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Rule 23(b)(3) issues posed by the interpretation and application of
the Settlement Agreement had been “put to rest” by the January
certification decision.169
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Together, these decisions evidence one of two prevailing
approaches taken by the federal circuits as to the level of proof
required to meet Rule 23(b)(3). The Second and Third Circuits
have followed an approach consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s BP
decisions.170 In contrast, the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh circuits
have denied certification when a class contains claimants who
cannot demonstrate injury caused by, or traceable to, the
defendant’s conduct.171
While a judicial solution rectifying the split is possible, it
remains unlikely. Divergent applications will likely continue until
the Supreme Court agrees to resolve these issues. On December 8,
2014, however, it denied certiori to hear BP’s appeal of the Fifth
Circuit decisions described above.172
The next section will discuss the approach taken by the D.C.
Circuit, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits (the “Individualized Proof”
approach). The subsequent section will describe the standard that is
169

Id.
See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 243–44 (2d Cir.
2012); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011).
171
See In re Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Meeting the predominance requirement demands more than
common evidence . . . . The plaintiffs must show that they can prove, through
common evidence, that all class members were in fact injured.”); Halvorson v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In order for a class
to be certified, each member must have standing and show an injury in fact that
is traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed in a favorable decision.”);
Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782 (11th Cir.
2014) (denying certification when plaintiffs’ damages model could not attribute
losses to each defendant).
172
Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Rejects BP’s Appeal of Oil Spill
Settlement, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=
1202678363544/Supreme-Court-Rejects-BPs-Appeal-of-Oil-Spill-Settlement?
slreturn=20150121002706.
170
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applied by the Second and Third Circuits (the “Global Peace”
approach), which is consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s BP
decisions.173 This latter approach will then be examined in light of
CAFA’s underlying policy aims and the Supreme Court’s
precedent.
A. Individualized Proof Approach
The cases below illustrate the Individualized Proof approach,
which has two distinct features. First, certification is found
inappropriate when members of the class cannot sufficiently trace
the injury alleged to the defendant’s conduct. Second, it demands
that district courts conduct a careful evidentiary analysis of the
plaintiffs’ claims to ensure that an adequate measure for proving
damages exists. When the predominance inquiry turns on
individualized damages determinations incapable of class-wide
resolution, courts will deny certification.
1. The D.C. Circuit: In re Rail Freight Surcharge
Antitrust Litigation
In In re Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litigation (Rail),174
the D.C. Circuit denied certification when individual injuries could
not be shown under the putative class’s damages model.175 The
class included a group of shippers alleging that four major freight
railroads engaged in a price-fixing scheme in violation of federal
antitrust law.176 The issue concerned “whether the plaintiffs could
show, through common evidence, injury in fact to all class
members from the alleged price-fixing scheme.”177
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that deficiencies in the
damages model rendered certification improper.178 According to
173

In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 815
(5th Cir. 2013).
174
In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.-MDL No. 1869, 725
F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
175
Id. at 252.
176
Id. at 247.
177
Id. at 294.
178
Id. at 255. The plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate injury through two
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the court, where unreliable means of proving such injury exist,
predominance cannot be met.179 Instead, “when a case turns on
individualized proof of injury, [then] separate trials are in
order.”180 The D.C. Circuit noted that “Rule 23 not only authorizes
a hard look at the soundness of statistical [damages] models that
purport to show predominance—the rule commands it.”181
2. The Eighth Circuit: Halvorson v. Auto-Owners
Insurance Company
The D.C. Circuit’s application of the predominance
requirement is consistent with that taken by the Eighth Circuit in
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company.182 There, the court
held that Rule 23(b)(3) was not satisfied when individual fact
inquiries were required to prove class members’ damages.183
Halvorson concerned a breach of contract and bad faith claim
arising from allegations that Auto-Owners employed an arbitrary
cap on insurance payments under its PIP policy.184 The
regression models. Id. at 249–50. The first model attempted to “isolate the
common determinants of the prices” that plaintiffs paid to the four defendantrailroads. Id. at 250. The second model—the “damages model”—attempted to
“quantify, in percentage terms, the overcharge due” to the defendant’s conduct.
Id. Yet when the second model was applied to shippers bound by contracts
negotiated prior to the alleged misconduct, it yielded similar results. Id. at 252.
Accordingly, the same formula the district court relied on to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) “also detect[ed] injury where none could exist.” Id.
179
Id. at 252–53.
180
Id. at 253.
181
Id. at 255.
182
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2013).
183
Id. at 777.
184
Id. at 774. Under the terms of the Policy, Auto-Owners represented that
it would pay “reasonable charges incurred” for medical injuries sustained from
car accidents. Id. at 775. In practice, the company compared claims against the
80th percentile for services rendered in a defined geographic area. It would
routinely approve payments up to the amount that “80 percent of doctors in the
area” charge for services. Id. Payments for amounts that surpassed that
percentile were rejected. Id. The plaintiffs contended that this practice resulted
in the “nonpayment of reasonable medical expenses” and represented a breach
of the insurance policy. Id.
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Halvorsons, as lead plaintiffs, attempted to bring a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action.185 They sought to certify a class consisting of all
persons in North Dakota and Minnesota covered by the policy and
who had received less than the full amount of a claim submitted.186
The district court denied certification for Minnesota
policyholders,187 but granted certification for those covered in
North Dakota.188
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the individual
inquiries pertaining to determining breach of contract and bad faith
for each class member precluded certification.189 Members of the
proposed class each sustained different injuries.190 They “were
treated by different medical providers charging different prices for
their services.”191 Yet under state law, the plaintiffs’ allegations
require a determination of the “usual and customary” rate for each
claim.192 In light of the differences among each member’s claim,
the Eighth Circuit found that individual inquires would
predominate over the proposed class.193 Resolving whether each
payment was “usual and customary” would “overwhelm” any
common questions of law or fact regarding the defendant’s
policy.194

185

Id. at 774–76.
Id. at 775.
187
Id. at 776. Minnesota state law required arbitration to resolve all nofault claims for under $10,000. Id. The district court found the “arbitration
requirement shatters” the requirements of Rule 23(a), as the Minnesota
claimants would “comprise a subclass that ‘would have radically different
interests’” from the North Dakota class members. Id. (citation omitted).
188
Id.
189
Id. at 779–80.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. (“To determine whether there was a breach of contract under North
Dakota law will require an analysis of what are ‘usual and customary’ rates.”).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 779 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433
(2013)).
186
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The Eleventh Circuit: Bussey v. Macon County
Greyhound Park

In Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park,195 the Eleventh
Circuit held that certification was improper when the plaintiffs’
damages model did not provide an accurate method for
calculating—and attributing—the alleged loss to each defendant.196
The plaintiffs brought state statutory law197 claims against
Victoryland, an Alabama gambling establishment, and the
manufacturers of three electronic bingo machines that were in use
at the casino.198 In their claims against the manufacturers, the
plaintiffs had to prove not only that they lost money on the
machines, but the amount of each member’s losses.199 The district
court certified the class despite acknowledging the individualized
nature of these inquires.200 It found that any “shortcomings”
pertaining to damages were “issues for sifting at the merits stage,
not the class certification stage.”201
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this notion on appeal.202 By
deferring questions of damages to a later stage in litigation, the
district court failed to address the plaintiffs’ inability to proffer a
method of quantifying the losses attributable to each manufacturer
named as a defendant.203 The Eleventh Circuit relied on Comcast,
which reiterated the necessity for courts to conduct a careful
195

Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782 (11th
Cir. 2014).
196
Id. at 790–91.
197
Id. at 784; see ALA. CODE § 8–1–150(A) (2014). The statute at issue
renders void “all contracts founded in whole or in part on a gambling
consideration.” ALA. CODE § 8–1–150(A). It further allows persons who have
lost money while using a gambling machine to recover that sum by filing an
action within six months of payment. Bussey, 562 F. App’x at 784; see ALA.
CODE § 8–1–150(A).
198
Bussey, 562 F. App’x at 784.
199
Williams v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-191, 2013
WL 1337154, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2013).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Bussey, 562 F. App’x at 790. The Eleventh Circuit appeal concerned the
three machine manufacturers, not Victoryland or its officers. Id. at 784.
203
Id. at 790.
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analysis of the pleadings at the certification stage.204 This analysis
inquires into any individual damages issues up front, then seeks to
resolve them before an affirmative grant of certification. Finding
that the district court had not conducted this “rigorous analysis,”
the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case.205 Without proof that
damages were calculable on a class-wide basis, questions affecting
individual members predominated over common questions with
respect to the manufacturers’ liability.206
B. The Global Peace Approach
Three circuits engage in the Global Peace approach, which
bypasses the rigorous predominance inquiry described above.207
Instead, these circuits grant certification of classes despite
uncertainty over the ability of various members to assert viable
claims.208 Both of the Fifth Circuit BP decisions, as well as recent

204

Id. (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013)).
Id. at 791. In doing so, it instructed the lower court to allow additional
discovery on the issue of damages. Id. at 791 n.8.
206
Id. at 790–91 (quoting Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433).
207
This term is used to highlight the notion that class action settlements,
while not all “global” in the literal sense, provide a sense of peace to three
distinct parties—class members, defendants, and courts—by serving as “private
administrative systems” that “shift claims from the ordinary tort system to a
private regime that promises more efficient compensation for plaintiffs, longterm peace for defendants, and a reduced litigation burden for the courts.”
Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 (2002).
208
See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242–43 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that lead plaintiffs not required to prove fraud-on-the-market
presumption to satisfy predominance requirement); Sullivan v. DB Invs. Inc.,
667 F.3d 273, 304 (3d Cir. 2011) (certifying the class although individual
members were unable to bring a valid claim under applicable state law); In re
Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 376–77 (5th Cir.
2014) (holding that claimants were not required to prove their claims using trialtype evidence that show their injuries were traceable to the spill); see also
Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 308 (2014) (citing these same cases as
examples of the less stringent application of Rule 23(b)(3) certification
procedures).
205
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cases by the Second and Third Circuits, are illustrative of this
approach.
Although each of these cases has arisen in classes involving
settlement rather than trial, Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements are no
different.209 The Global Peace approach is an alternative to the
Individualized Proof inquiry. Under the approach, predominance
can be met despite various class plaintiffs’ questionable ability to
prove that damages are traceable to the defendant’s conduct.
1. The Second Circuit: In re American International Group,
Inc. Securities Litigation
In re American International Group, Inc. Securities Litigation
(AIG) involved several securities fraud class actions filed against
AIG and other defendants in October 2004.210 In 2006, the lead
plaintiffs sought to certify a class defined as all “investors who
purchased AIG’s publicly traded securities between October 28,
1999, and April 1, 2005.”211 Thereafter, Gen Re, a named
defendant, moved for judgment on the pleadings. It argued that,
because the plaintiffs had “not established or even pled that the
Gen Re Defendants made any public misstatement or omission
with regard to AIG,” the traditional presumption of reliance could
not apply.212 The district court denied certification, holding that
individual issues of reliance would predominate over common
issues regarding claims against Gen Re.213 After the district court
rejected a settlement agreement between the Gen Re and the class
for the same reason, the parties appealed to the Second Circuit to

209

See Klonoff, supra note 68, at 804 (observing the Supreme Court has
“held that predominance must be satisfied even for settlement classes”); see also
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (explaining that
Rule 23(b)(3) demands “undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
context”).
210
In re Am. Int’l Grp., 689 F.3d at 232–33. The complaint alleged
violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 233.
211
Id.
212
Id. (quoting In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
213
Id. (quoting In re Am. Int’l Grp., 265 F.R.D. at 175).
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resolve the issue of certifying the settlement class.214
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the class’ inability to
satisfy the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not defeat a
finding of predominance.215 According to the court, the existence
of a settlement agreement “alter[ed] the outcome of the
predominance analysis.”216 It acknowledged that, in a litigation
class, deferring plaintiffs’ proof of fraud-on-the-market until after
certification would be inappropriate.217 This is because, under
Supreme Court precedent, a defendant’s successful rebuttal of the
presumption defeats the predominance requirement along with any
viable 10(b) claims.218 According to the Second Circuit, however,
“with a settlement class, the manageability concerns posed by
numerous individual questions of reliance disappear.”219
Effectively, then, defendants may settle class suits “even if a court
believes that those claims may be meritless, provided that the class
is properly certified under Rules 23(a) and (b).”220
2.

The Third Circuit: Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.

In Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.,221 the Third Circuit
certified a nationwide class under 23(b)(3) although numerous
members were unable to bring a valid claim under applicable state
law.222 The case concerned a nationwide class action suit against
De Beers, alleging antitrust and consumer protection violations of
both state and federal law.223 There were two nationwide
214

Id. at 237. The parties contended that, although “certification of a
litigation class” was deemed inappropriate, the court “could—and should—
nonetheless certify a settlement class.” Id. at 236–37.
215
Id. at 242–43.
216
Id. at 242.
217
Id.
218
Id. (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 n.29 (1988)).
219
Id. at 241.
220
Id. at 243–44.
221
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011).
222
Id. at 304–05.
223
Id. at 285–86. The complaint alleged that De Beers orchestrated a global
sales network with competitor diamond producers. Id. at 286. De Beers was
charged with “executing output-purchase agreements with competitors,
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settlement classes: direct and indirect diamond purchasers.224
However, only the indirect class sought damages under state,
rather than federal, law.225
At issue before the Third Circuit was the propriety of certifying
the nationwide indirect purchaser class under Rule 23(b)(3) when
various members possessed no legal claim under state law.226 The
court found that the variations in the substantive state law
underlying individual claims did not overwhelm the common legal
and factual issues regarding De Beers’ liability.227 According to
Judge Rendell, the settlement posture228 of the case effectively
“marginalize[d]” any concern “that state law variations undermine
a finding of predominance.”229 The court concluded that settlement
eliminated the “principal burden of establishing the elements of
liability under disparate laws.”230 It was instead sufficient that each
member of the Rule 23(b)(3) class shared “a similar legal question
arising from whether De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy that
was aimed to and did affect” U.S. diamond prices.231
Underlying the court’s application of the predominance
setting/synchronizing production limits, restricting the resale of diamonds in
certain geographic regions, and directing marketing and advertising.” Id.
224
Id. at 287.
225
Id.
226
See id. at 285. For example, some states allowed indirect purchasers to
recover for an antitrust violation. Id. at 348 (Jordan, J., dissenting). Still, others
have “declared unequivocally” that indirect purchasers lack standing to bring
such a claim. Id. Even more, a number of other states have observed that indirect
purchasers lack standing to bring “what is effectively an antitrust claim.” Id. In
short, in at least some of the states, putative members are fully foreclosed “from
bringing an antitrust claim, no matter how they dress it up.” Id.
227
Id. at 297 (majority opinion).
228
De Beers and the indirect purchaser class reached a settlement
agreement prior to the grant of certification. Id. at 287–88. This agreement had
two stipulations. First, De Beers would establish a $250 million settlement fund,
which would be distributed among members of the indirect purchaser class. Id.
at 288. Second, it agreed not to contest certification of the class. Id.
229
Id. at 302–03.
230
Id. at 303. The court relied on its own precedent in reaching its
conclusion. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions,
148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that variations in state law do not
defeat predominance).
231
Sullivan, at 343 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
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requirement is a policy preference for “global peace.”232 Under this
notion, a rigorous predominance application, which requires that
class members allege a “colorable claim,” prevents defendants
from effectively buying peace through settlement.233 The majority
determined that by entering into a comprehensive settlement, De
Beers sought to avoid prolonged litigation and re-litigation of
“settled questions” across state and federal courts.234 This,
according to the court, weighed in favor of overlooking otherwise
fatal infirmities among numerous members’ claims.235
3. The Fifth Circuit: In re Deepwater Horizon Decisions
The In re Deepwater Horizon decisions discussed above are
the most recent application of the Global Peace approach. Both the
certification decision and the decision interpreting the Settlement
Agreement found predominance satisfied although the class
contained members unable to prove their alleged damages had
been caused by the spill.236 In its January decision, the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged that damages calculations raised “individual
questions that are not capable of class wide resolution.”237
However, the variance among members’ ability to prove damages
232

Id. at 310–11 (majority opinion). Some scholars refer to the “global
peace” notion espoused by the court as a “peace premium.” See generally D.
Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 1183, 1207 (2013). This concept reflects the notion that defendants may
be willing to pay a mark-up to settle a class action in order to resolve all similar
claims, meritorious or not, so as to foreclose piecemeal litigation or settlement
of individualized issues. Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil
Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 416
(2014).
233
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 310.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 310–12.
236
See In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790,
818–19 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the class satisfied the predominance
requirement despite some members being unable to trace alleged losses to the
spill); In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon III), 744 F.3d 370, 373 (5th
Cir. 2014) (holding that BEL claimants were not required to use trial type
evidence to prove losses were caused by the spill).
237
Deepwater Horizon II, 739 F.3d at 815.
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was not sufficient to defeat predominance. According to the court,
“the existence of a settlement agreement allows the district court to
dispense altogether” with resolving issues of individualized
damages.238 Like in Sullivan, once common questions regarding
liability were established, the need to resolve individualized
inquiries pertaining to the class effectively disappeared.239
The March decision, upholding certification of the Rule
23(b)(3) class, held claimants need not submit evidence that their
alleged injury arose as a result of the spill.240 It was sufficient that
each member attest, “under penalty of perjury, that [their] claim in
fact was due” to the oil spill.241 As with Second and Third Circuits,
the Fifth Circuit found settlement to be a mitigating factor in
resolving whether individual issues across the class may defeat
certification.242 Predominance was met despite the modest degree
of proof required of claimants regarding causation.243 As the
Majority opinion observed, this merely represented “a contractual
concession” by the defendant, not a fatal defect in the
predominance inquiry.244
C. The Global Peace Approach in Light of Supreme Court
Precedent
The Global Peace approach directly conflicts with the Supreme
Court’s Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence. Both the AIG and Sullivan
courts found that questionable claims among the class did not
defeat predominance. This, they reasoned, was because the case
management problems that such individualized issues present are
mitigated by the lack of a trial.245 In the January decision affirming
238

Id. at 818.
See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring) (finding same
operative fact of liability sufficient when various members could not plead claim
under state law).
240
Deepwater Horizon III, 744 F.3d at 372.
241
Id. at 376–77.
242
Id. at 378.
243
Id.
244
Id. at 377.
245
See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2011); In
re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 2012).
239
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certification, the Fifth Circuit also relied upon what it saw to be an
ameliorating effect of settlement upon questionable claims.246
Although the court recognized that potential infirmities across
claims did exist, settlement rendered these issues “resolved and . . .
answered.”247
Like these circuits, the Supreme Court has also recognized that
settlement is germane to class certification.248 But it has stressed
the need for more vigilance in applying Rule 23(b)(3) when
“individual stakes are high and disparities among class members
great.”249 The predominance analysis therefore “demand[s]
undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context.”250
According to the Court, this serves to protect the interests of
absentee members who would be disadvantaged by overbroad or
unwarranted definitions of the class.251
In light of these concerns, recent Supreme Court decisions have
urged for courts to undertake a “rigorous” analysis at the
certification stage.252 This seeks to ensure that damages alleged by
class members bear a causal connection to the defendant’s
conduct.253 While damage calculations “need not be exact,” they
must be “attributable” to the legal theory establishing the
defendant’s liability.254 Yet in each of the cases following the
Global Peace approach, the Court found predominance met despite
facial infirmities in this regard. In AIG, the Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiffs
were incapable of alleging the rebuttable presumption of fraud-onthe-market against the Gen Re defendant.255 Likewise, in Sullivan,
246

In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 818
(5th Cir. 2014).
247
Id.
248
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997)
(“Settlement is relevant to a class certification.”).
249
Id. at 625.
250
Id. at 620.
251
Id.
252
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (quoting WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011)).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 242–43 (2d Cir.
2012).
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various members of the nationwide class could not legally bring a
claim against the defendant under relevant state law.256 Still, in
each case, predominance was satisfied.
The inconsistency between the Global Peace approach and the
Supreme Court’s Rule 23(b)(3) precedent has only deepened the
split between the circuits. The circuits that follow the
Individualized Proof approach have relied heavily on cases such as
Wal-Mart and Comcast. Yet, as described above, the Second,
Third, and Fifth Circuits have avoided the more rigorous review
demanded by the very same opinions. The result: a landscape of
class certification jurisprudence that shares many of the policy
concerns that precipitated CAFA’s enactment.
D. Return to Pre-CAFA Concerns: The Implications of a
Circuit Split
Each party involved in the class action loses when circuits
apply divergent standards of proof at certification. As Professor
Ricahrd Nagareda observed, “a jurisprudence of class actions that
includes precedents for both underreach and overreach in the
certification inquiry unwittingly adds to the potential for judicial
slight of hand in either direction.”257
Business defendants have been particularly outspoken
regarding the potential impact that the present split can have on
their interests.258 In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court, the U.S.
256

Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 348 (3d Cir. 2011). These
findings are also difficult to reconcile with Wal-Mart. There the Court instructed
that the party seeking certification “must affirmatively demonstrate” compliance
with requirements of Rule 23. Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(2011). In each of the relevant cases, however, the circuits allowed certification
despite numerous members lacking the ability to plead a legally cognizable
claim.
257
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 170 (2009).
258
Both the United States Chamber of Commerce and the Government of
the United Kingdom filed amicus briefs to the Supreme Court on behalf of BP,
seeking to have the Court resolve the uncertainty between the circuits. See
Motion for Leave To File Amicus Brief and Brief for Amici Curiae the Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S. of Am., et al. in Support of Petitioners, BP Exploration
& Prod. Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014) (No. 14-
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Chamber of Commerce expressed concern that the Fifth Circuit’s
decisions, if permitted to stand, may “impose, enormous,
unsubstantiated liability” on businesses named as class action
defendants.259 This liability, it argued, would “then affect
consumers, in the form of higher prices.”260 According to the
Chamber of Commerce, this was a danger “particularly acute in the
class action context,” where class counsel “are apt to choose a
forum that would permit an increase in the breadth of any eventual
settlement.”261 “After all,” it was sure to point out, “larger
settlement results in larger [attorneys’] fees.”262
These concerns should sound familiar. Business defendants and
“their fellow-traveler amici” have been “perfectly capable of
ratcheting up catastrophic bombast to” portray perceptions of class
actions litigation’s “in terrorem effect” on corporations.263 This
was true prior to CAFA, and it appears to be the case today.264 Yet
one need not surrender to this rationale to find merit in resolving
the present circuit split. The certification decision is increasingly
recognized as the pivotal moment in class action litigation.265
Denial of certification can leave legitimately harmed parties
without representation or a means for redress.266 Affirmative grants
may, despite all the hyperbolic arguments, spell immense trouble
for businesses that are named as defendants.267 Moreover, “there
are not a lot of do-overs in the class certification realm.”268 Most
123), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/09/bpchambercertamicus.pdf [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Brief]; Brief of Her
Britannic Majesty’s Gov’t of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, BP Exploration & Prod. Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land &
Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014) (No. 14-123), available at
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/09/bp-ukcertamicus.pdf.
259
Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 258, at 11.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Linda S. Mullenix, Putting Proponents to Their Proof: Evidentiary
Rules at Class Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 606, 630 (2014).
264
See supra Part I.C.1.
265
See Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1262–63.
266
Mullenix, supra note 263, at 630.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 631.
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cases settle before trial but after certification, thereby making
certification “the district judge’s last word . . . [or] test of the
decision’s factual premises.”269 In order to provide the greatest
protections for class-members, defendants, and the viability of the
class action vehicle as a whole, a coherent legislative response is
required.270
IV. PUTTING THE “F” BACK
SOLUTION
A.

IN

CAFA: TOWARD

A

LEGISLATIVE

Preliminary Considerations

The proposal must provide evidentiary governance
mechanisms that require a baseline level of proof from the class
members at the certification stage. At the same time, the
procedural framework must take into account the practical
difficulties and concerns pertaining to the availability of such
information, and the ultimate issue of how much proof will be
sufficient. Any proposed amendment to class action certification
269

Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001);
see Mullenix, supra note 263, at 631.
270
These issues are important, especially in light of the substantial
economic costs small claims class actions under 23(b)(3) can impose. Recently,
Toyota settled a class action litigation related to unintended acceleration in some
of its vehicles, with the class including economic loss members. Jonathan
Sourbeer, Op. Ed., A Close Reading of My $20.91 Settlement Check, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 24, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/jonathan-sourbeer-a-closereading-of-my-20-91-settlement-check-1416780793. The court awarded the
class attorneys over $27 million in fees and costs, with the 25 primary plaintiffs
and class representatives receiving $395,270 in total and non-representative
members, those who never even opted in to the class or actively pursued the
litigation, receiving checks for as low as a dime under $21. Id. As Mr. Sourbeer
writes:
If all the time, loss and suffering of the 25 plaintiffs and
representatives of the lawsuit are only worth some $400,000,
what law of efficient economics justifies $27 million in legal
expenses for such a paltry return? None, unless the real return
goes almost entirely to the law firms––in this case the more
than $200 million that will be recouped from future car buyers
and others.
Id.
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procedures must be responsive to the legitimate aims that the class
action vehicle serves. These values include providing dignity,
vindication, and individualized civil justice, to groups of
legitimately harmed plaintiffs.271 In that respect, it must strike a
fine balance between providing for procedures that enable courts to
filter illegitimate claims, while not discouraging meritorious ones.
In short, it must provide a framework that preserves “the tripartite
values of justice, economy, and efficiency . . . without descending
into sloppiness or cynicism.”272
B. Guidance From the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA) of 1995
Securities litigation is one subcategory within the larger class
action context. Yet the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) of 1995273 provides an apt example, and subsequently, an
assessment, of an attempt to solve perceived misuse of the class
action vehicle through procedural legislation.
Like CAFA, the PSLRA made its way through Congress274
motivated by an attempt to bring “sanity and evenhandedness to
the [securities fraud] class-action schema[,]” which was perceived
271

As will be discussed in the proposal, this requires an exception for
certain cases where the social value of bringing the claim outweighs the cost of
allowing the class to be certified when a heightened Rule 23(b)(3) analysis
would otherwise lead to denial of certification. See Katie Melnick, In Defense of
the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a
Response To Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 755, 788–
93 (2008) (offering a strong argument regarding the many social benefits that
class actions have traditionally been recognized to foster, including deterrence,
social justice, and access to the courts).
272
Cabraser, supra note 22, at 518.
273
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
274
In fact, the PSLRA passed Congress over presidential veto. The reason
for then-President Clinton’s veto was the belief that the heightened pleading
requirements would impose “an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious
claims being heard in Federal courts.” See Kathryn B. McKenna, Pleading
Securities Fraud Using Confidential Sources under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: It’s All in the Details, 55 RUTGERS L. REV 205,
210 (2002) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S19035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)).
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at least by the act’s proponents, to be pungent with abuses.275 To
deal with these issues, the PSLRA introduced a heightened
pleading standard for securities class actions and other procedural
mechanisms,276 which sought to ferret out non-meritorious
claims.277
Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs are required to “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind” to mislead
investors.278 According to Professor Michael A. Perino, the
275

andré douglas pond cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the
1994 Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Contributed To the Collapse of the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L.
REV. 979, 1005–06 (2005). See also Swack v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 230
F.R.D. 250, 258 (D. Mass. 2005) (considering, as one of the policies underlying
enactment of PLSRA, “Congress’ response to perceived abuses in securities
fraud litigation”); In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1053–54 (D. Colo. 2001) (“The purpose of the PSLRA is to prevent an
onslaught of expensive and frivolous lawsuits when stock prices plummet,
which could force corporations to settle meritless claims to avoid the expense of
discovery and trial.”).
276
Another major component of this legislation was the addition of Section
21D to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG &
JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 875
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 10th ed. 2011). This introduced procedures that
enabled courts to appoint lead plaintiffs to monitor the class action litigation and
reduce potential agency costs that may result due to divergent interests between
class counsel and the class of shareholder plaintiffs. Id.
277
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 924 (2003) (describing that heightened
pleading was considered to function as “an appropriate solution to
nonmeritorious class actions”); see also EISENBERG & COX, supra note 276, at
875 (“What prompted Congress to act was the burgeoning number of securities
class actions that Congress believed were largely nuisance suits initiated to
extract settlements that benefitted only the class action lawyers, produced small
rewards to investors alleged harmed by the fraud, and rendered the U.S. capital
markets anticompetitive versus rival foreign markets.”).
278
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). Specifically, for a security holder to allege
a fraudulent omission or misleading statement, the complaint must “specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” Id.
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Securities and Exchange Commission favored a procedural device
to curb frivolous claims, rather than substantive changes that may
unsettle existing securities law.279 As both scholars280 and industry
practitioners281 have noted, however, Congress’ failure to
adequately define the term “strong inference,” the PSLRA’s
scienter requirement, or “set forth a rubric for courts to use to
determine whether a plaintiff pled facts sufficient” to allege such a
motive in the statute, yields a situation similar to Rule 23(b)(3)
class certification jurisprudence.282
Circuits have promulgated wide-ranging approaches to
defining key terms under the PSLRA.283 As a result, courthouses
279

Perino, supra note 277, at 924 n.63 (citing then-SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt’s response to written questions of Senator Domencini of New Mexico,
during 1994 Senate hearings prior to enactment of the law, where the former
Chairman stated that ‘meritless litigation should be addressed through carefully
crafted procedural and pleading requirements,’ rather than by changing the
‘fundamental scope’ of substantive securities law).
280
Id. at 926 (“Courts have split sharply over precisely what the ‘strong
inference’ portion of the standard requires.”); see James D. Cox, et al., Do
Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class
Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 421 (2009)
(“Federal appellate courts have promulgated divergent legal standards for
pleading fraud in securities fraud class actions after the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act.”).
281
Sharon Nelles and Hillary Huber represent financial institutions and
global companies in civil lawsuits, regulatory and criminal investigations, and
enforcement actions at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. Their recent article, Pleading
Securities Fraud Claims: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, observes that one
fallout from the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirement has been the
difficulty federal courts have experienced agreeing upon a uniform
interpretation of the provision’s key terms. Sharon Nelles & Hilary Huber,
Pleading Securities Fraud Claims: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 45 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 653, 656 (2014) (describing that ambiguity as a result of Congress’s
failure to further define ‘strong inference’ under the PLSRA has led to “a circuit
split, with courts across the country applying different standards”).
282
Id.
283
John M. Wunderlich, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The
Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 623 (2008) (“Without legislative
guidance on how to apply the scienter requirement, the federal courts embarked
on the long road of discerning the congressional intent behind the nebulous
language of ‘strong inference.’ The circuits invariably took different paths.”).
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diverge regarding the pleading sufficient to satisfy the scienter
requirement under the statute.284 Importantly, however, this split
has not led to forum shopping.285 A 2011 study by James Cox,
Randall Thomas, and Lynn Bai analyzed over 10 years of postPSLRA litigation data and estimated that “almost 85 percent of
cases being brought [were filed] in the circuit of the defendant
firm’s principal place of business,” rather than the circuit with the
most (relatively) favorable interpretation of “strong inference.”286
At the same time, the authors of the study note that the divergent
circuit applications raise significant concerns, including the
potential undermining of substantive law.287
The PSLRA can guide the proposed CAFA amendment in at
least two respects. First, a pleading standard seeking to resolve
divergent judicial applications will never result in total uniformity
in courts across the country. Judges will, and should, exercise
discretion when applying the standard to the unique factual
characteristics of the class and case presented.288 The circuits
284

Id. at 624 (describing the “gamut of possibilities” that different circuits
have used in making this determination).
285
Cox, et al., supra note 280, at 451 (finding that “data supports the
conclusion that differences across pleading requirements do not support
significant forum shopping”).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 452. In addition to undermining substantive law, the professors
argue that forum shopping contributes to the following: the potential for
overburdening of the jurisdiction(s) with the most plaintiff-friendly approach,
removing the site of the litigation far from the source of the conflict so as to
increase the parties’ expenses, and more generally, perpetuating “a negative
perception of the fairness of the legal system.” Id. Although the authors believe
that a clear and consistent interpretation can rectify the split, it is important to
note that Cox, Thomas, and Bai describe the need for a judicial determination
from the Supreme Court: “for example, identifying which of the three disparate
approaches [among circuits] it believed was consistent with the intent of
Congress.” Id. at 453.
288
See generally Wolff, supra note 85 (arguing that courts inherently have,
and will continue to, possess some discretion over class certification decisions,
which may promote positive values). Professors James A. Grundfest and A.C.
Pritchard argue that a level of ambiguity in the drafting of statutes might be
optimal. James A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002). As they explain:
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grappled with interpreting the PSLRA’s “strong inference”
language following its enactment.289 It may be inevitable that a
“particularity” standard in the proposed amendment to CAFA
would lead to similar interpretive issues.
The PSLRA provides an example of how vague drafting and
unclear legislative history can create divergent court approaches.290
The split regarding the proper interpretation of PSLRA’s “strong
inference” was, at least in part, a result of ambiguity regarding
which circuit approach Congress had intended to adopt.291 In order
to achieve uniformity, any new amendment must—unlike the
PSLRA—be articulately drafted and accompanied by a clear
legislative history. In amending CAFA, Congress must be
unequivocal in adopting the approach of the Individualized Proof
circuits. Still, it should not expect to create an automated
procedural framework that eliminates room for interpretation.292
Instead, this Note urges for the implementation of a standard in an
area of the law where courts presently lack any clear statutory,
procedural guidance whatsoever.

[A]n unresolvable measure of ambiguity may be part of the
essential fabric of our legal regime. Efforts to impose greater
precision than the underlying political structure can bear may
lead nowhere because the political equilibrium between the
judicial and legislative branches may benefit from a base level
of interpretive ambiguity.
Id. at 636.
289
See Nelles & Huber, supra note 281, at 656–58. It is important to note,
however, that the PSLRA included both “particularity” and “strong inference,”
and much of the disagreement among courts has been over interpreting the
latter. Id.
290
An incoherent legislative history and confusing drafting was a major
criticism of the statute. Illustrating the opinion of at least one court, Judge
Gilbert Stroud Merritt Jr. of the Sixth Circuit described the PSLRA as a “statute
containing general language . . . of abstraction, [and] an ambiguous legislative
history.” Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2001).
291
Specifically, it was unclear whether the statute sought to incorporate the
Second Circuit’s “motive and opportunity” test, or an even more rigorous
standard with this language. Cox, et al., supra note 280, at 431.
292
For a developed analysis of how courts will inevitably interpret statutes
and procedural determinations slightly differently, and why this may be
beneficial, see Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645 (2011).
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V. SHAPING THE AMENDMENT
The following sections urge Congress to adopt a modified
Individualized Proof approach. To begin, the practical and policydriven concerns presented by the competing approaches will be
assessed. The remaining sections set forth the components of the
proposed approach, which includes three main features: a
particularity pleading standard; a provision exempting certain
cases from this heightened pleading when obtaining the requisite
proof is highly impracticable; and finally, increased evidentiary
oversight in cases implementing this exemption. By enacting this
amendment, Congress can add a degree of clarity to Rule 23(b)(3)
certification, the most pivotal stage in class action litigation.
A. Choosing a Standard Between Competing Approaches
1. The Arguments For and Against The Individualized
Proof Approach
The Individualized Proof approach recognizes that discrete
issues of proof, particularly damages, are often common among
members of a class.293 It therefore calls for more vigilance at the
certification stage to prevent circumvention of Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance requirement. Each of the three circuits applying this
approach emphasized a careful evidentiary analysis of the
pleadings to ensure that proffered damages models represent
injuries that are in fact traceable to the defendant’s conduct.294 At
the same time, one obvious infirmity of this approach is that most,
if not all, classes are incapable of providing “perfectly uniform
damages.”295
There are practical difficulties in pleading a class-wide injury
in-fact. This is felt acutely in employment discrimination class
actions, where showing class-wide discriminatory treatment can
present significant hurdles to certification.296 An accepted benefit
293
294
295
296

Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1228.
See supra Part III.A.
Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1229.
See Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, supra note 81,
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of the class action vehicle is that it allows the class to enforce legal
rights that, as individuals, members may not pursue.297 Critics of
heightened certification argue that a more rigorous Rule 23 review
deters such claims, and thereby denies access to justice.298 These
are legitimate concerns, which the proposed amendment seeks to
address. Still, proponents of a heightened pleading standard have
countered the “access to justice” argument with a fairness claim of
their own. At least in certain contexts, some believe it is
“fundamentally unfair to force a defendant to spend millions or
tens of millions” to defend claims rooted in “a few short
paragraphs of a complaint,” rather than factual proof.299 Complex
litigation is costly and enhanced pleading standards can address the
issue.300
Another critique of a full-faith application of the Individualized
Proof approach would be “the perverse incentive for bad actors” to
cause more injury to more persons.301 As Alex Parkinson imagines,
“[b]y increasing the size of the class, the wrongdoer increases its
at 620 (describing the difficulties proving class-wide injury in Title VII
employment discrimination class-actions).
297
See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications
of Dukes v.. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 34, 36–37 (2011) (offering a
summary of the enforcement benefits class actions provide, and writing that,
without the vehicle, “those with small claims and limited resources are unlikely
to challenge powerful corporations on their own, effectively immunizing
companies from complying with the law”).
298
See Francisco Valdes, Procedure, Policy and Power: Class Actions and
Social Justice in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
627, 654 (2008) (describing how increased scrutiny over race-based class actions
has amounted to a denial of access to justice); Suzette M. Malveaux, The Power
and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class Action Landscape after WalMart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 659, 661 (2013) (claiming that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart compromises employee-plaintiffs’ “access to
justice”).
299
This argument has been used in class actions pertaining to antitrust
claims. Edward Cavanagh, Pleading Rules in Antitrust Cases: A Return To Fact
Pleading?, 21 REV. LITIG. 1, 11 (2002). However, it is a valid concern for any
large class action.
300
See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431,
489 (2008) (noting the rising costs of class action litigation and suggesting
amending civil pleading standards as a potential solution).
301
Parkinson, supra note 49, at 1230.
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chances of creating a variance in damages.”302 In a court adhering
to a strict Individualized Proof approach, every additional injured
plaintiff represents a net benefit to the defendant. In most cases,
each successive harmed plaintiff would not pursue a suit on his or
her own.303 At the same time, the greater the number of injured
parties, the greater the variance in damages among members of the
class.304 This, in turn, would chip away at the “perfect uniformity
of a proffered class,” and make certification under a demanding
Individualized Proof regime a less likely result.305
The Individualized Proof approach is also susceptible to
criticism on grounds that it overlooks potential benefits of judicial
economy. This benefit occurs when courts are able to try
numerous, relatively minor claims at once, as opposed to hundreds
or thousands of separate actions. 306 As the Global Peace approach
cases show, this argument appears to have particular force when
the parties agree to pursue settlement.307
Critics of the Individualized Proof approach also warn that a
stringent pre-certification review can lead to previewing the merits
of a case before trial.308 Objectors argue this amounts to judicial
“overreaching,”309 or usurping “the jury’s role to weigh and

302

Id.
Id.
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 671 (2014) (“Rule 23(b)(3) was meant to achieve
judicial economy, promote decisional consistency, and enable private
enforcement of the substantive law where individual suits were not costjustified.”).
307
See supra Part III.B. Yet it should be reiterated that the Supreme Court
has endorsed a more rigorous Rule 23 approach when settlement is proposed.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (stating that Rule
23(b)(3) demands “undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
context”); Green, supra note 25, at 1779.
308
See generally Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 751, 782 (2012); Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided
Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification
Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 935 (2009).
309
Campos, supra note 308, at 782.
303
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adjudicate conflicting evidence,”310 at a stage where all that is
sought to be determined is the procedural question of certification.
Others respond that this argument is overstated.311 As Professor
Linda S. Mullenix argues, judges have proven perfectly capable in
limiting the appropriate inquiry to “whether the proposed action
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 and nothing more.”312
Moreover, in the absence of a more focused inquiry, both parties
“have wide latitude to inject frivolous” arguments to “bolster or
undermine a finding of predominance.”313 When the certification
determination touches upon an underlying legal issue in a claim or
defense, it might therefore be optimal for the court to address it.
2. The Arguments for and Against the Global Peace
Approach
The Global Peace rationale relies on notions of manageability
and judicial efficiency as well as the purported contractual nature
of class action settlements.314 A key feature of the approach is the
hesitancy to engage in a critical review of pre-certification
pleadings.315 This is buttressed by the belief that “class
certification simply provides a procedural means to address civil
wrongdoing on a mass scale.”316 Proponents emphasize that Rule
310

Klonoff, supra note 68, at 756.
See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 263, at 639–40 (attempting to rebut the
argument that enhanced certification standards lead to impermissible pre-trial
merits reviews); Anthony F. Fata, Doomsday Delayed: How the Court’s PartyNeutral Certification Standards in Wal-Mart v. Dukes Actually Helps Plaintiffs,
62 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 684–87 (2013) (arguing that “Rule 23 proceedings are
not a dress rehearsal for trial,” but, as a practical matter, “litigants will continue
to put their spin on the merits in class certification proceedings”).
312
Mullenix, supra note 263, at 639–40.
313
Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1269.
314
See e.g. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Scirica, J., concurring) (“[A] district court’s certification of a settlement simply
recognizes the parties’ deliberate decision to bind themselves according to
mutually agreed-upon terms without engaging in any substantive adjudication of
the underlying cause of action.”).
315
See id. at 305 (“Rule 23 makes clear that a district court has limited
authority to examine the merits when conducting the certification inquiry.”).
316
Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement
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23 is designed only to answer the threshold question of
certification. Weighing the merits at this preliminary stage can lead
to attacks of the underlying legal theories in a manner more
appropriately suited for trial.317
The Global Peace approach places significance on the
distinction between litigation and settlement classes in applying the
predominance inquiry. An overemphasis on this distinction,
however, overlooks “the broader concerns about cohesion,
leverage, and fairness” that often arise in large, class action
settlements.318 Many scholars point to issues of agency costs in
class action litigation. This occurs when “lawyers who act as
agents for the class have financial incentives to negotiate
settlements that prioritize their own interests at the expense of class
members’ interests.”319 As Professor Erichson points out, a “class
action settlement binds all members of the certified class even
though virtually none of the class members have agreed to it.”320
Nevertheless, courts relying on this approach have been willing to
apply a traditional contract law gloss over large class action
settlements as justification of either binding the class, as the Third
Circuit did in Sullivan,321 or preventing defendants from revoking
their deals ex post, as was the driving force behind the Fifth
Circuit’s BP decisions upholding the agreement.322 In either case,
courts applying this standard may sidestep what can be important,
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1873
(2006).
317
See, e.g., Olson, supra note 308, at 935–37 (criticizing inquiries into
underlying merits at certification); Klonoff, supra note 68, at 731 (finding that
engaging in the merits at the certification stage results in “experienced class
action defense counsel [that] can frequently identify a number of promising
arguments to defeat certification, even in fairly routine cases”).
318
Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 951, 981 (2014) [hereinafter Erichson, The Problem Of
Settlement].
319
Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New
Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1015 (2005).
320
Erichson, The Problem of Settlement, supra note 318, at 967.
321
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J.,
concurring).
322
In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 739 F.3d 790, 818
(5th Cir. 2014).
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merits-based evaluations. When invoked selectively, this standard
yields a “patchwork of discretionary decisions difficult to justify
on principled grounds.”323
B. The Proposed Amendment and Its Key Components
In shaping its amendment to CAFA, Congress should adopt a
modified Individualized Proof approach to certifying all class
actions, including those to be certified for settlement only. This
amendment should include three components. First, it must ensure
that all members can prove with particularity the elements giving
rise to their individual claims. Second, exceptions are necessary for
cases where such proof is impracticable. Finally, preliminary
judgments324 should be provided in cases where courts grant an
exception.
1. Adding Particularity to the Predominance Review
A stringent standard of proof at the certification stage comports
with the Supreme Court’s recent precedent. Most recently, in
Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, the Supreme Court specifically
addressed the degree of stringency needed to evaluate Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance question as it pertains to individualized
damage calculations.325 There, the Court repeated its position in
Wal-Mart and Amchem, stating, “[i]f anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a)”

323

See Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1254. As Professors Bone and
Evans point out, judges tempted to “skirt over technical and complex evidence,”
especially in cases of settlement, where decisions are insulated from appellate
review, run counter to the “intent and purpose” of Rule 23, which has been
described as serving to further “the twin policies” of efficiency and deterrence.
Id. at 1260, 1331.
324
This term refers to a procedure identified by Professor Geoffrey P.
Miller, which is described in greater detail below, and essentially asks judges to
engage in non-binding threshold merits determinations, which either party may
object to. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
165 (2010).
325
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013).
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and places upon courts a “duty to take a ‘close look’ at whether
common questions predominate over individual ones.” 326
A particularity standard shifts the focus away from generalized
claims and puts the onus on the sufficiency of the facts.327 In the
class action context, where the stakes are so large, it is important
for claims to be rooted in sufficient factual bases.328 This attempts
to reduce the “natural plaintiff’s instinct to be over-inclusive in
framing classes.”329 In fact, a particularity requirement strives to
impose a notion of procedural fairness. Nearly every class action
that is certified will settle before trial.330 These settlement
negotiations can be enhanced with procedural safeguards that
require plaintiffs to support their claims with adequate evidence,
prior to certification.
A particularity standard is already employed within the context
of pleading fraud or mistake under Federal Rule 9(b). Fraud claims
have been “understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation.”331
The standard was justified in part to “protect defendants from
sweeping fishing expeditions under the pretext of a lawsuit, as well
as specious allegations.”332 Those most critical of the rule contend
326

Id. at 1432.
See Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends
in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011)
(suggesting that a particularity standard requires plaintiffs to plead a greater
level of factual detail).
328
Nagareda, Common Answers, supra note 92, at 152 (“As a descriptive
matter, class certification stands not as a mere judicial byway on the road toward
full-fledged trial on the merits but, almost invariably, as the last significant
judicial checkpoint on the road toward settlement.”); see also Mullenix, supra
note 263, at 632 (“Once the serious consequences of class certification are
embraced, it follows that all actors involved should be required to produce and
secure as reliable a record as necessary to ensure that a court has appropriate
information upon which to make a serious class certification decision.”).
329
Miller, supra note 324, at 322.
330
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements
and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 812 (2010) (observing
that “virtually all cases certified as class actions and not dismissed before trial
end in settlement”).
331
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).
332
Emily T. Chen, Depressing Diagnosis: Stringent Particularity
Requirement of the Rule 9(B) Pleading Standard as a Critical Bar to Off-Label
Promotion Fraud Whistleblowers, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 353 (2014).
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that it dismisses otherwise colorable claims that do not measure up
to the standard.333 Yet the rule remains in place and its application
has shown that courts do not treat the particularity standard as a
death knell to otherwise legitimate claims.334
Support for a particularity standard requires addressing two
objections to heightened certification procedures. The first
contention is that enhancing the degree of pre-certification proof
leads to expensive discovery that effectively prevents access to the
courts.335 A particularity standard does add a degree of diligence
on behalf of counsel prior to initiating the action, but it does not
require more spending and does not aim to deter legitimate
claims.336 Attorneys on both the class and defense bar already
333

See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(B): Do We
Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143,
147–50 (1985) (describing the drawbacks of 9(b)’s pleading standard). Professor
Jeff Sovern writes: “if the pleader lacks access to the information omitted from
the complaint, dismissal seems a draconian result. Such a pleader must make his
case before engaging in discovery—often an impossible task—rather than
pursuing the normal course of engaging in discovery in making his case,”
thereby potentially allowing “a guilty defendant to hide behind insufficient
pleadings to prevent the truth from emerging.” Id at 154–55.
334
Morwenna Borden, Particulars of Particularity: Alleging Scienter and
the Proper Application of Rule 9(B) to Duty-Based Misrepresentations, 98
Minn. L. Rev. 1110, 1118–19 (2014). Borden observes that while courts “vary
in their precise application” of the standard, they “have found numerous ways
for a fraud claim to meet the particularity requirement.” Id.
335
See Mullenix, supra note 263, at 640 (describing these concerns as dual
critiques of enhanced certification standards).
336
With a more rigorous approach to Rule 23(b)(3), “considerable preinstitution attention must be paid by counsel to the composition and definition of
the class as well as the substantive claims to be advanced.” Miller, supra note
208, at 322. Here, it should also be noted that, for some, class actions have been
viewed as a battle between “David”—the class comprised of financially
disadvantaged, small-claims plaintiffs—versus “Goliath”—the corporate
defendant. See Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal
Strategy, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 331(2011) (citing cases in the Third and
Fourth Circuits and evoking such imagery). While the corporate defendant will
still likely outspend the class, the traditional “David vs. Goliath” dynamic has
changed. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 339 (2010). The past two decades have seen
a tremendous increase in low-risk, high-reward class actions financed by thirdparty investors, often in the amount of tens of millions of dollars. Id. at 339–41
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engage in costly discovery concerning pre-trial certification.337 A
particularity requirement does not seek to impose more evidentiary
digging. Instead, it demands that attorneys apply “measured
evidentiary standards to their offer to the court.”338
A second objection to a heightened pleading standard is that it
can lead courts to address disputes that delve into the genuine
merits of the litigation.339 There is concern that heightened
certification inquiries “effectively converts a class certification
motion into a minitrial before trial.”340 A particularity standard
would urge lawyers to refine the record before certification to hone
in on a showing of predominance. It thereby seeks to curb
unnecessary “probing behind the pleadings,” rather than invite
it.341 Moreover, Professors Robert Bone and David Evans are
correct to point out that it would be foolish to “believe the current
system completely insulates its procedural rules from a substantive
review.”342 The Supreme Court has acknowledged and endorsed
the need for courts to engage in assessments of the underlying
merits when those substantive issues are relevant to the Rule 23
requirements.343 A particularity standard would in no way alter this
established precedent.
2. The Need for Exceptions
Congress should allow exemptions for certain cases when
members are unable to meet the standard for particularized

(describing the nature of third party litigation financing in the United States and
elsewhere, and discussing its policy concerns).
337
Mullenix, supra note 263, at 640.
338
Id. at 641.
339
See generally Olson, supra note 308 (criticizing courts for engaging in
resolution of “bona fide disputes about the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims when
deciding whether certification is warranted”).
340
Mullenix, supra note 263, at 639.
341
Id. at 639–41 (quoting Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(2011)) (arguing that heightened evidentiary requirements at certification
mitigate merits-based review).
342
See Bone & Evans, supra note 5, at 1283.
343
See supra Part I.D.
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proof.344 This exception is most appropriate in cases where the
benefits of bringing a class action outweigh the costs of denial for
failure to meet the standard. Many civil rights and employment
class actions are driven by their considerable social value, but
might be especially susceptible to issues of class-wide proof.345
This is true in employment discrimination class actions alleging
company-wide policies and practices that discriminate on the basis
of race or gender.346 The example of discrimination cases does not
attempt to draw a bright line test as to which cases would fall into
this exception. Rather, courts should make a series of
considerations in determining when these exceptions should apply.
The type of case is paramount. The nature of the injury, and
whether it is capable of factual proof, is another.
Even in a relatively small class, anti-discrimination claims are
difficult to prove with factual, non-anecdotal evidence.347 Meeting
a heightened predominance requirement, then, can turn the
certification inquiry into a battle of statisticians.348 This analysis
may also be difficult for juries and judges to follow.349 Moreover,
as compared to economic or physical loss caused by tortious or
fraudulent conduct, for example, discrimination cases allege an
344

See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More
Functional Rule 23, 46 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1097, 1118 (2013) (arguing that
erroneous certification denials of civil rights class actions pose serious risks of
high social costs).
345
See supra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of why Title VII claims generally
face a steep burden to certification.
346
See Winnie Chau, Something Old, Something New, Something
Borrowed, Something Blue and a Silver Sixpence for Her Shoe: Dukes v. WalMart & Sex Discrimination Class Actions, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 969,
1001 (2006) (describing the substantial value in allowing certification of
employment discrimination class actions despite issues of individualized proof).
347
See Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, supra note 81,
at 629 (“[A]s the class decreases in size, so too does the available pool of
anecdotal evidence. Thus, the named plaintiff of a small class may well find it
difficult to present sufficient proof of any kind.”).
348
See id. at 628–29 (describing that certification decisions in employment
discrimination cases hinge on the quality of statistical proof).
349
Peter M. Panken, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Statistical Pitfalls in
Age Discrimination Cases, ALI-CLE Course Materials, SU015 ALI-CLE 1339
(2012).
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injury that is quite possibly incapable of sound calculation.350 The
appropriate certification standard for these cases is the subject of
much debate, and is not the focus of this Note.351 Yet
discrimination cases provide one example of the type of injury that
might warrant the use of an exception. In any case, these
exceptions should be wielded in a pragmatic, prudential fashion.
3. Preliminary Judgments
Congress should require preliminary judgments for cases that
are subject to the exemption. These preliminary judgments would
clarify the extent to which Rule 23(b)(3) requirements have been
met. In a 2010 article, Professor Geoffrey P. Miller describes
preliminary judgments as “tentative judicial assessment[s] of the
merits of a case or any part of a case.”352 Certification decisions
are, by and large, determinations of discretion.353 However, as
noted above, choosing to allow an exception from a particularity
standard would implicate an added degree of discretion on behalf
of the court. Through requiring preliminary judgments, courts will
provide “direct, honest, and systematic”354 representations as to
350

See Klonoff, supra note 68, at 748, 824 (comparing securities fraud and
Title VII class actions and noting that the former often presents readily
calculable damages).
351
There are many articles addressing the appropriate degree of pleading in
employment discrimination class actions. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Class
Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 441 (2013) (urging the Supreme Court to reject heightened pleading
because of its perceived effect of deterring employment discrimination cases);
Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011) (discussing the difficulties practitioners and
plaintiffs face in framing their complaints, specifically, the sufficient level of
proof required in employment discrimination cases).
352
See Miller, supra note 324, at 165. Professor Miller uses the term
preliminary judgments to mean non-binding threshold merits determinations. Id.
He argues that preliminary judgments can alleviate many of the barriers faced by
parties at settlement, while also serving the aims of transparency, consistency,
and fairness. Id.
353
See Wolff, supra note 85 (describing how courts have “broad
discretion” in deciding whether a class action will be certified).
354
Miller, supra note 324, at 168.
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their findings on the purported class’ compliance with Rule 23.
In practice, a preliminary judgment would be non-preclusive
and non-final.355 It would serve the valuable function of providing
litigating parties (as well as future litigants) a necessary evaluation
of the class and case.356 This can be beneficial to future claimants
by serving notice of the type of proof that works, and that which
does not, before they chose to file for certification. It also engages
the court in creating a written account of why the proffered class is
exempt from a heightened particularity standard. It has been
observed that when decision makers can state “the principles upon
which [the decision] relie[s]. . .the very act of providing them may
engender respect as well by treating the losing litigants and the
public at large as deserving of an explanation.”357 Even when
exceptions are granted, preliminary judgments create a written
record that maintains the focus on compliance with the
predominance inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Without a clear standard governing Rule 23(b)(3)
determinations, class certification jurisprudence will continue to
diverge. Although Congress failed to establish any such standard
when it passed CAFA, the inconsistency among circuits harms the
legitimacy of the class action vehicle as a tool for ensuring

355

Once made, preliminary judgments will not become final until the
losing part makes use of its opportunity to object, with or without cause, “in
which case the judgment would be vacated and the case would proceed
according to ordinary rules of procedure.” Id.
356
See id. at 186 (explaining that preliminary judgments may increase the
supply of information available to future litigants).
357
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More Honest Than Ever Before:
Abandoning Pretense and Recreating Legitimacy in Constitutional
Interpretation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 384 (1995). In addition, preliminary
judgments might prove valuable in settlement negotiations. As Professor Miller
points out, “[a]lthough settlement negotiations would still progress in the usual
way . . . the range of disagreement would be significantly constrained by the fact
of the judgment. Overall, therefore, the preliminary judgment could assist in
overcoming signaling effects that interfere with settlement bargaining.” Miller,
supra note 324, at 176.
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accountability, equity, and efficiency.358 Rule 23(b)(3) ensures that
class actions can be brought with “economy of effort and
uniformity of result” without sacrificing “undue dilution of
procedural safeguards” for both class members and defendants.359
Congress must amend CAFA to prevent these important aims from
becoming nothing more than hollow promises.

358

See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500,
509 (2011) (describing the three “identifiable policies” of class actions as
“accountability, efficiency, and equity”).
359
See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,
390 (1966). Benjamin Kaplan served as the reporter to the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules from its inception through 1966, helping draft subdivision (b)(3)
of Rule 23 in 1966.

